The Lacedaemonians Taking up the narrative from Thuc. 1.126 . then had on the occasion of their first embassy directed the Athenians, and received a counter demand from them, to take such measures about the expulsion of the accursed.
 Later, however, they frequently repaired to Athens and bade them withdraw from Potidaea, and give Aegina its independence, and above all they declared in the plainest terms that they could avoid war only by rescinding the decree about the Megarians, See Thuc. 1.67.4 , and the references in Aristoph. Arch. 520-3 and Aristoph. Arch. 533 f. The date of the decree must have been near the outbreak of the war (432). in which they were forbidden to use any of the ports in the Athenian empire or even the Athenian market.

 But the Athenians would pay no heed to their other demands and declined to rescind the decree, charging the Megarians with encroachment upon the sacred land and the border-land not marked by boundaries, The reference is, first, to the tillage of land dedicated to the Eleusinian goddesses; second, to land still in dispute between Athens and Megara, and therefore unmarked. and also with harbouring runaway slaves.

 But at last a final embassy came from Lacedaemon, consisting of Ramphias, Melesippus, and Agesander, who said nothing of the demands they had hitherto been wont to make, but only this: "The Lacedaemonians desire peace, and there will be peace if you give the Hellenes their independence."
 Whereupon the Athenians called an assembly and gave their citizens an opportunity to express their opinions;
 and it was resolved to consider the whole question and then give their answer once for all.

 And many others came forward and spoke, in support of both sides of the question, some urging that war was necessary, others that the decree should not stand in the way of peace, but should be rescinded;
 and finally Pericles son of Xanthippus, the foremost man of the Athenians at that time, wielding greatest influence both in speech and in action, came forward and advised them as follows:

 " I hold, men of Athens, to the same judgment as always, that we must not yield to the Peloponnesians, although I know that men are not as a rule moved by the same spirit when they are actually engaged in war as when they are being persuaded to undertake it, but change their judgments in accordance with events.
 And now also I see that I must give you the same or nearly the same advice as in the past, and I demand that those of you who are persuaded by what I shall say shall support the common decisions, even if we should in any way fail, or else, in case of success, claim no share in the good judgment shown.
 For it is just as possible for the course of events to move perversely as for the plans of men;
 and it is for that very reason that we commonly lay upon fortune the blame for whatever turns out contrary to our calculations.

 "As for the Lacedaemonians, it was perfectly clear before that they were plotting against us, and it is now clearer than ever.
 For whereas it was expressly stipulated that we should submit our differences to arbitration, each side meanwhile keeping what it had, they have never yet asked for arbitration themselves nor do they accept it now when we make the offer.
 What they want is to redress their grievances by war rather than by discussion, and they are here dictating already and no longer expostulating.

 For they order us to raise the siege of Potidaea, restore the independence of Aegina, and rescind the Megarian decree;
 and these men that are just come boldly proclaim that we must give all the Hellenes also their independence.

 But let no one of you think that we shall be going to war for a trifling matter, if we should refuse to rescind the Megarian decree—the thing they especially insist upon, saying that there will be no war if it is rescinded—and do not let there remain in your minds any self-reproach that it was a small matter for which you went to war.

 For this trifling thing involves nothing less than the vindication and proof of your political conviction.
 If you yield this point to them you will immediately be ordered to yield another and greater one, as having conceded this first point through fear;
 whereas by a downright refusal you will give them clearly to understand that they must be more disposed to deal with you on terms of equality.

 So make up your minds, here and now, either to take their orders before any damage is done you, or, if we mean to go to war,—as to me at least seems best--do so with the determination not to yield on any pretext, great or small, and not to hold our possessions in fear.
 For it means enslavement just the same when either the greatest or the least claim is imposed by equals upon their neighbours, not by an appeal to justice but by dictation. "

 But as regards the war and the resources of each side, make up your minds, as you hear the particulars fiom me, that our position will be fully as powerful as theirs.

 For the Peloponnesians till their lands with their own hands;
 they have no wealth, either private or public;
 besides, they have had no experience in protracted or transmarine wars, because, owing to their poverty, they only wage brief campaigns separately against one another.

 Now people so poor cannot be manning ships or frequently sending out expeditions by land, since they would thus have to be away fiom their properties and at the same time would be drawing upon their own resources for their expenses, and, besides, are barred from the sea as well. i.e., by the superior navy of the Athenians. Again, it is accumulated wealth, and not taxes levied under stress, that sustains wars.
 Men, too, who till their own lands are more ready to risk their lives in war than their property;
 for they have confident hope of surviving the perils, but no assurance that they will not use up their funds before the war ends, especially if, as may well happen, the war is protracted beyond expectation.

 Indeed, although in a single battle the Peloponnesians and their allies are strong enough to withstand all the Hellenes, yet they are not strong enough to maintain a war against a military organisation which is so different from theirs, seeing that they have no single general assembly, and therefore cannot promptly put into effect any emergency measure;
 and as they all have an equal vote and are of different races they each strive to advance their own interests.
 In such circumstances it usually happens that nothing is accomplished.

 And indeed it could scarcely be otherwise, for what some of them want is the greatest possible vengeance upon a particular enemy, others the least possible damage to their own property.
 And when after many delays they do meet, they give but a scant portion of their time to the consideration of any matter of common concern, but the larger portion to their own individual interests.
 And each one thinks no harm will come from his own negligence, but that it is the business of somebody else to be provident on his behalf;
 and so, through all separately cherishing the same fancy, universal ruin comes unperceived upon the whole body.

 And what is most important, they will be hampered by scarcity of money, seeing that providing it slowly they are subject to delays;

 but the opportunities of war wait for no man. "Moreover, neither the planting of forts in our territory Thuc. 1.122.1 need cause us to be afraid, nor yet their navy.

 For as regards the first, it is a difficult matter even in time of peace to construct here a city that will be a match for ours, to say nothing of doing this in a hostile country and at a time when we have fortifications quite as strong to oppose them.

 But suppose they do establish a fort;
 although they might injure a part of our territory by making raids and receiving our deserters, yet that will not be sufficient to prevent us from sailing to their land and building forts there, or making reprisals with our fleet, wherein our strength lies.

 For we have gained more experience of operations on land from our career on the sea than they of naval operations from their career on land.

 As for their acquiring the art of seamanship, that is an advantage they will not easily secure;

 for even you, who began practising it immediately after the Persian war, have not yet brought it to perfection.
 How then could men do anything worth mention who are tillers of the soil and not seamen, especially since they will not even be permitted to practise, because we shall always be lying in wait for them with a large fleet?

 For if they had to cope with only a small fleet lying in wait, they might perhaps risk an engagement, in their ignorance getting courage from their mere numbers;
 but if their way is blocked by a large fleet, they will remain inactive, their skill will deteriorate through lack of practice, and that in itself will make them more timid.

 Seamanship, like any other skill, is a matter of art, and practice in it may not be left to odd times, as a by-work;
 on the contrary, no other pursuit may be carried on as a by-work to it.

 "Then again, if they should lay hands upon the money at Olympia or Delphi and try to entice away the mercenaries among our sailors by the inducement of higher pay, that indeed might be a dangerous matter if we were not a match for them, assuming that both citizens and our resident aliens have manned our ships.
 But as a matter of fact we are a match for them, and, what is of the highest importance, we have citizens for pilots, and our crews in general are more numerous and better than those of all the rest of Hellas.

 And no one of our mercenaries, The mercenaries drawn from the states of the Athenian confederacy; no one of those who had taken part with the Peloponnesians would be allowed to return to his native city. when it came to facing the risk, would elect to be exiled from his own land and, with a lesser hope of victory at the same time, fight on their side because of the offer of a few days' high pay.

 "Such, as it seems to me at least, or approximately such, is the situation as far as the Peloponnesians are concerned;
 as regards our own, I believe we are free from the defects I have remarked upon in them, and that we have in other respects advantages which more than counterbalance theirs.

 If they march against our territory, we shall sail against theirs;
 and the devastation of a part of the Peloponnesus will be quite a different thing from that of tle whole of Attica.
 For they will be unable to get other territory in its place without fighting, while we leave an abundance of territory both in the islands and on the mainland.

 A great thing, in truth, is the control of the sea.
 Just consider: if we were islanders, who would be more unassailable ?
 So, even now, we must, as near as may be, imagine ourselves such and relinquish our land and houses, but keep watch over the sea and the city;
 and we must not give way to resentment against the Peloponnesians on account of our losses and risk a decisive battle with them, far superior in numbers as they are.
 If we win we shall have to fight them again in undiminished number, and if we fail, our allies, the source of our strength, are lost to us as well;
 for they will not keep quiet when we are no longer able to proceed in arms against them.
 And we must not make lament for the loss of houses and land, but for men;
 for these things do not procure us men, but men these.
 Indeed, had I thought that I should persuade you, I should have urged you to go forth and lay them waste yourselves, and thus show the Peloponnesians that you will not, for the sake of such things, yield them obedience.

 " Many other considerations also lead me to hope that we shall prove superior, if you will consent not to attempt to extend your empire while you are at war and not to burden yourselves needlessly with dangers of your own choosing;
 for I am more afraid of our own mistakes than of the enemy's plans.

 But these matters will be explained to you on some later occasion when we are actually at war;
 at the present time let us send the envoys back with this answer: As to the Megarians, that we will permit them to use our markets and harbours, if the Lacedaemonians on their part will cease passing laws for the expulsion of aliens so far as concerns us or our allies (for nothing in the treaty forbids either our action or theirs;
 as to the states in our confederacy, that we will give them their independence if they were independent when we made the treaty, and as soon as they on their part grant the states in their alliance the right to exercise independence in a manner that conforms, not to the interest of the Lacedaemonians, but to the wishes of the individual states;
 and as to arbitration, that we are willing to submit to it in accordance with the treaty, and will not begin war, but will defend ourselves against those who do.

 This answer is just and at the same time consistent with the dignity of the city.
 But we must realise that war is inevitable, and that the more willing we show ourselves to accept it, the less eager will our enemies be to attack us, and also that it is from the greatest dangers that the greatest honours accrue to a state as well as to an individual.

 Our fathers, at any rate, withstood the Persians, although they had no such resources as ours, and abandoned even those which they possessed, and by their resolution more than by good fortune and with a courage greater than their strength beat back the Barbarian and advanced our fortunes to their present state.
 And we must not fall short of their example, but must defend ourselves against our enemies in every way, and must endeavour to hand down our empire undiminished to posterity."

 Sucl were the words of Pericles: and the Athenians, thinking that he was advising them for the best, voted as he directed, and answered the Lacedaemonians according to his bidding, both as regards the particulars as he set them forth and on the whole question, to the effect that they would do nothing upon dictation, but were ready in accordance with the treaty to have all complaints adjusted by arbitration on a fair and equal basis.
 So the Lacedaemonian envoys went back home and thereafter came on no further missions.

 These were the grounds of complaint and the causes of disagreement on both sides before the war, and they began to appear immediately after the affair of Epidamnus and Corcyra.
 Nevertheless the two parties continued to have intercourse with one another during these recriminations and visited each other without heralds, i.e. without the formalities which are indispensable after war is declared. though not without suspicion;
 for the events which were taking place constituted an actual annulment of the treaty and furnished an occasion for war. AT this point in my narrative begins the account of the actual warfare between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians and their respective allies.
 While it continued they ceased having communication with one another except through heralds, and when once they were at war they waged it without intermission.
 The events of the war have been recorded in the order of their occurrence, summer by summer and winter by winter. The mode of reckoning customary in the time of Thucydides and continued long afterwards. In such a scheme the summer included the spring and the winter the autumn; the summer period was equal to about eight months, the winter to about four.