"With respect to the Thebans, they had on many other occasions wronged us; and as for the last occasion, you know yourselves on what account we are in our present condition.

 For as they were seizing our city in time of peace, and, moreover, at a holy time of the month, we did right in avenging ourselves on them, according to the principle recognised by all, that it is allowable to defend oneself against the attack of an enemy;

 and it would not now be fair that we should suffer on their account. For if you take your views of justice from your own immediate advantage and their animosity, you will show yourselves no true judges of what is right, but rather attentive to what is expedient.

 And yet if they appear to be serviceable to you now, much more did we and the rest of the Greeks then, when you were in greater danger. For now you are yourselves attacking others, and the objects of their fear; but at that crisis, when the barbarian was bringing slavery on all, these Thebans were on his side And it is but just, that against our present misdeed—if we have really done amiss—you should set the zeal we showed then;

 and you will find it greater

 Literally,

 the greater opposed to the less.

 than the fault to which it is opposed, and exhibited at those critical times when it was a rare thing for any of the Greeks to oppose his courage to the power of Xerxes; and therefore those were the more commended who did not in safety act for their own interest with regard to his invasion, but were willing to dare with dangers the better part.

 But though we were of that number, and honoured by you in the highest degree, we are now afraid that we have been ruined by acting on the same principles, because we chose the side of the Athenians from regard to right, rather than yours from regard to interest.

 And yet men should consistently take the same view of the same case, and account expediency to be nothing else than this—when good allies receive everlasting gratitude for their services, while our own immediate interest in any case is secured. 

"Consider, too, that at present you are esteemed by the Greeks in general a pattern of honour and virtue: but if you pass an unjust sentence on us, (for this is no obscure cause that you will decide, but as men of high repute yourselves, you will pass sentence on us who are also not contemptible,) beware lest they may not approve of your coming to any improper decision respecting men of good character, though you are yourselves of still better; nor of spoils which were taken from us, the benefactors of Greece, being devoted in the national temples.

 For it will seem a shocking thing that Lacedaemonians should have destroyed Plataea; and that your fathers should have inscribed the name of that city on the tripod at Delphi for its good services, whereas you utterly obliterated it from the whole Grecian name for the sake of Thebans. For to such a degree of misfortune have we been brought:

 if the Medes had been victorious, we should have been ruined; and now we are supplanted by Thebans in your good opinion, who were before our best friends; and we have been subjected to two dangers, the greatest that can be imagined—then, to that of being

 Bloomfield, in his last edition, rightly explains αἰσχίστῳ (as Göller had already done) by comparing the words of Ammianus Marcellinus,

 fame, ignavissimo mortis genere, tabescentes;

 and observes that

 to be pined to death was, according to the idea of the ancients, a death, as compared with that of dying with arms in one's hands, especially ignominious, as suggesting the idea of a snared brute beast.

 Yet he inconsistently retains the part of his original note, in which he objected to Hobbes rendering the word by

 base,

 a term to which Hobbes himself doubtless attached the same meaning. Gottleber and Poppo refer ἐσαμένων as well as κτισάντων to θυσίας; and the collocation of the words certainly makes this the most natural mode of explaining them. Bloomfield, however, denies that ἕω is ever used in such a figurative sense, and maintains that it can only refer here to ἱερά. starved to death, if we had not surrendered our city; and now, to that of being tried for our lives.

 And thus we Plataeans, who were zealous beyond our power in the cause of the Greeks, are rejected by all, deserted and unassisted; for of those who were then our allies, no one helps us; and as for you, Lacedaemonians, our only hope, we fear that you are not to be depended upon. 

"And yet, for the sake of the gods who once presided over our confederacy, and of our valour in the cause of the Greeks, we call on you to relent and change your mind, if you have been persuaded to any thing by the Thebans; and to ask as a boon from them in return, that they would not kill those whose death is not honourable to you; and to receive an honest gratitude [from us], instead of a disgraceful one [from them];

 and not, after giving pleasure to others, to incur infamy for it yourselves. For it is an easy matter to take away our lives, but a difficult one to wipe out the disgrace of it;

 since we are not enemies, that you should justly take vengeance on us, but men well disposed towards you, and who went to war with you only on compulsion. You would judge the case therefore rightly, if you both granted us personal security, and considered beforehand that you received us by our own consent, and while holding forth our hands to you—and the law of the Greeks is not to kill such—and, moreover, after our being all along your benefactors.

 For look to the sepulchres of your fathers, whom, after being slain by the Medes, and buried in our country, we used to honour every year at the public expense with both garments and other things that are usual, and by offering first-fruits of all that our land produced in its season; as friends from a friendly country, and as allies to our former companions in arms.

 But you would do the contrary of this, should you decide unjustly. For consider: Pausanias buried them with a conviction that he was laying them in a friendly land, and amongst men of that character; but you, if you kill us, and make the Plataean territory a part of the Theban, what else will you do but leave your fathers and kinsmen in a hostile country, and amongst their murderers, unhonoured with the gifts which they now receive? And further, you will condemn to slavery the land in which the Greeks won their freedom; will desolate the temples of the gods to whom they prayed, before conquering the Medes; and will take away our ancestral sacrifices from those who founded and instituted them. 

 This were not to your credit, Lacedaemonians, nor to offend against the general principles of the Greeks and your own forefathers, nor to destroy us, your benefactors, for other men's hatred of us, without having been wronged yourselves; but rather, to spare us, and relent in your hearts, having taken a rational pity on us; reflecting not only on the dreadful nature of the things we should suffer, but also on the character of the sufferers, and how misfortune admits not of calculating on whom it may one day fall, even without his deserving it.

 We then, as is suitable for us, and as our need induces us to do, entreat you, with invocations to the gods who are worshipped at the same altar, and by all the Greeks in common, that we may prevail on you in these things; pleading the oaths which your fathers swore, we pray that you will not be unmindful of them: we beseech you by your fathers' tombs, and appeal for aid to the dead, that we may not come under the power of the Thebans, nor those who are dearest to them be given up to those who are most hateful. We remind you, too, of that day on which we performed the most glorious things in their company, and yet now on this day are in danger of suffering the most dreadful.

 But, to bring our speech to a close—a thing which is necessary, and at the same time hard for men so circumstanced, because the peril of our life approaches with it—we now say, in conclusion, that we did not surrender our city to the Thebans, (for before that we would have preferred to die the most inglorious death—that of famine,) but confided in and capitulated to you. And it were but fair, that, if we do not persuade you, you should restore us to the same position, and let us ourselves take the risk that befalls us.

 At the same time we solemnly beseech you, that we who are Plataeans, and who showed the greatest zeal for the cause of the Greeks, may not be given up, suppliants as we are, out of your hands and your good faith, Lacedaemonians, to Thebans, who are our bitterest enemies; but that you would become our preservers, and not, while you are giving freedom to the rest of the Greeks, bring utter destruction upon us.

 To this effect spoke the Plataeans. The Thebans, fearing that the Lacedaemonians might somewhat relent in consequence of their words, came forward, and said that they also wished to address them, since, contrary to their expectation, the Plataeans had had a longer speech allowed them than a simple answer to the question. So when they had given them leave, they spoke as follows: 

"We should not have asked permission to make this address, if the Plataeans, on their part, had briefly answered the question put to them, and had not turned upon us and delivered an invective; while at the same time they made a long defence of themselves, beyond the limits of the present question, and on points that had never been the grounds of any charge, together with a panegyric for things which no one found fault with. But as it is, we must answer their accusations, and refute their self-praises; that neither our disgrace nor their reputation may assist them, but that you may hear the truth on both points, and so decide.

 We quarrelled then with them in the first instance, because, on our settling Plataea at a later period than the rest of Boeotia, and some other places with it, of which we took possession after driving out their mixed population, these men did not think fit, as had been first arranged, to submit to our supremacy, but, apart from the rest of the Boeotians, offended against the principles of their fathers, and when they were being compelled to observe them, went over to the Athenians, in conjunction with whom they did us many injuries, for which they also suffered in return. 

"Again, when the barbarian came against Greece, they say that they were the only part of the Boeotians that did not Medize; and it is on this point that they most pride themselves, and abuse us.

 But we say that they did not Me- dize, because the Athenians did not either; but that in the same way, when the Athenians afterwards attacked the Greeks, they were the only people that Atticized. 

 Yet look in what political condition we respectively did this. For our city happened at that time to be governed neither by an oligarchy

 The term ἰσόνομος relates to the equality of all the citizens with one another, as far as related to their private disputes and private injuries; whereas under the worst form of oligarchy, which was called δυναστεία, those who were possessed of political power were also above the law in private matters, and could oppress their fellow-citizens at their pleasure. See Aristotle, Politics, iv.

5. 2.

 

— Arnold. with equal laws, nor by a democracy; but what is most opposed to laws and the best form of government, and comes nearest to [the rule of] a tyrant, a dominant party of a few individuals had the administration of affairs.

 And so they, hoping to hold it still more surely if the cause of the Mede were triumphant, kept down the populace by force, and introduced him; and the whole city was not its own master when it so acted; nor is it right to reproach it for what it did amiss when not in the enjoyment of its laws.

 At any rate, after the Mede had retreated, and it had regained its laws, you ought to consider, that when the Athenians subsequently attacked the rest of Greece, and endeavoured to bring our country under their power, and by the aid of faction were already in possession of the greater part of it, we fought and conquered them at Coronea, and liberated Boeotia, and are now heartily joining in the liberation of the other states, by furnishing horses, and such a force as no other of the allies do. With regard, then, to our Medizing, such is the defence we make 

"But that it is you, [Plataeans,] who have both done more injury to Greece, and are more deserving of extreme punishment, we will now attempt to prove. It was for vengeance against us, you say, that you became allies and fellow-citizens of the Athenians.

 Then you ought to have introduced them for aid against us alone, and not to have joined with them in attacking others; such a course having certainly been open to you, in case of your being at all led on by the Athenians against your will, since the confederacy against the Mede had already been formed by these Lacedaemonians here, which you yourselves bring forward most prominently [in your own defence]. Surely this was strong enough to divert us from attacking you, and, what is the greatest advantage, to enable you to take counsel in security. But of your own accord, and not by compulsion, you still took the part of the Athenians by preference.

 And you say that it had been base for you to betray your benefactors; but much more base and criminal was it so utterly to betray the whole body of the Greeks, with whom you confederated, than to give up the Athenians alone, who were enslaving Greece, while the others were its liberators.

 And it was no equal return of favour that you made them, nor one free from disgrace. For you introduced them, as you say, when you were being injured; but you became co-operators with them in injuring others. And yet not to return equal favours is more disgraceful than to fail in those which, though justly due, will be returned in furtherance of injustice. 

"You showed then plainly, that not even at that time was it for the sake of the Greeks that you alone did not Medize, but because the Athenians did not either, and because you wished to side with them, and against the rest.

 And now you claim to derive assistance from the circumstances in which you acted well through the influence of others. That however is not reasonable; but as you chose the Athenians, stand the brunt of the struggle with them, and do not bring forward the league that was then made, as though you ought to be spared from regard to that.

 For you deserted it, and in violation of it joined in enslaving the Aeginetans, and some others who had entered into it, rather than prevented their being enslaved; and that too not against your will, but while enjoying the same laws as you have to the present time, and without any one's compelling you, as they did us.

 Besides, the last proposal made to you before you were blockaded, that you should remain unmolested on condition of your aiding neither side, you did not accept. Who, then, could be more justly hated by the Greeks than you, who assumed an honourable bearing for their injury? And the goodness which you say you once exhibited, you have now shown to be not your proper character; but what your nature always wished, has been truly proved against you; for you accompanied the Athenians when they were walking in the path of injustice.

 With regard then to our involuntary Medizing, and your voluntary Atticizing, such are the proofs we have to offer. 

"As for the last injuries which you say that you received, namely, that we came against your city in time of peace and at a holy time of the month, we are of opinion that neither in this point did we act more wrongly than you.

 If, indeed, we came against your city by our own design, and fought, and ravaged the land as enemies, we are guilty. But if men who were the first among you, both in property and family, wishing to stop you from your foreign connexion, and restore you to your hereditary principles common to all the Boeotians, voluntarily called us to their aid, how are we guilty?

 Retorting the remark of the Plataeans, ch. 55. 5, οὐχ οἱ ἑπόμενοι αἴτιοι — ἀλλ᾽ οἱ ἄγοντες. For it is those who lead that are the transgressors, rather than those who follow.

 But neither did they do wrong, in our judgment, nor did we; but being citizens, like yourselves, and having more at stake, by opening their walls to us and introducing us into their city in a friendly, not in a hostile, manner, they wished the bad among you no longer

 i. e. understanding χείρους again after μᾶλλον, as Poppo explains it. Bloomfield supposes that μᾶλλον here assumes the nature of an adjective; and thus μᾶλλον γενέσθαι will mean,

 to be uppermost,

 to have the upper hand,—

 to be [in power] rather than others.

 But the passage which he quotes, ch. 82. 2, as an instance of such a usage, is not, I think, sufficiently parallel to justify this interpretation. to become worse, and the good to have their deserts; being reformers of your principles, and not depriving the state of your persons, but restoring you to your kinsmen; making you foes to no one, but friends alike to all. 

"And we gave you a proof of our not having acted in a hostile manner; for we injured no one, but made proclamation, that whoever wished to be governed according to the hereditary principles of all the Boeotians, should come over to us.

 And you gladly came, and made an agreement with us, and remained quiet at first; but afterwards, when you perceived that we were few in number, even supposing that we might be thought to have acted somewhat unfairly in entering your city without the consent of your populace, you did not requite us in the same manner—by not proceeding to extreme measures in action, but persuading us by words to retire—but you attacked us in violation of your agreement. And as for those whom you slew in battle, we do not grieve for them so much (for they suffered according to law—of a certain kind); but in the case of those whom you lawlessly butchered while holding forth their hands, and when you had given them quarter, and had subsequently promised us not to kill them, how can you deny that you acted atrociously?

 And now, after having perpetrated in a short time these three crimes—the breach of your agreement, the subsequent murder of the men, and the falsification of your promise not to kill them, in case we did no injury to your property in the country—you still assert that it is we who are the transgressors; and yourselves claim to escape paying the penalty for your crimes. No, not if these your judges come to a right decision; but for all of them shall you be punished. 

 And now, Lacedaemonians, it is with this view that we have gone so far into these subjects—both with reference to you and to ourselves—that you may know that you will justly pass sentence on them, and we, that we have still more righteously been avenged on them;

 and that you may not relent on hearing of their virtues in times long gone by (if, indeed, they ever had any); for though these ought to be of service to the injured, to such as are doing any thing base they should be a reason for double punishment, because they do amiss in opposition to their proper character. Nor let them derive benefit from their lamentations and pitiful wailing, while they appeal to the tombs of your fathers and their own destitution.

 For we show you, on the other hand, that our youth who were butchered by them received far more dreadful treatment; some of whose fathers fell at Coronea, in bringing Boeotia into connexion with you; while others, left lonely in their old age, and their houses desolate, prefer to you a far more just request for vengeance on these men.

 And with regard to pity, it is those men who suffer undeservedly that better deserve to receive it; but those who suffer justly, as these do, deserve, on the contrary, to be rejoiced over.

 Their present destitution, then, they have incurred by their own conduct; for they wilfully rejected the better alliance. Nor did they thus outrage all law in consequence of having first suffered at our hands, but from deciding under the influence of hatred, rather than of justice. And they have not now given us proportionate satisfaction for their crimes; for they will suffer by a legal sentence, and not while holding forth their hands after battle, as they say, but after surrendering to you on definite terms to take their trial.

 Avenge therefore, Lacedaemonians, the law of the Greeks which has been violated by these men. And to us who have been treated in contempt of all law return a due gratitude for the zeal we have shown; and let us not lose our place in your favour through their words, but give the Greeks a proof that you will not institute contests of words, but of deeds; for which a short statement is sufficient when they are good; but when they are done amiss, harangues dressed out with imposing language serve as veils for them.

 But if ruling states should, like you in the present instance, summarily pronounce their decisions on all offenders, men would be less disposed to seek for fine words as a screen for unjust actions.

 To this effect then spoke the Thebans. The Lacedaemonian judges, thinking that the question,

 Whether they had received any service from them during the war,

 would be a fair one for them to put, because they had all along requested them, as they said, to remain quiet according to the original covenant of Pausanias, after the [retreat of the] Mede; and when afterwards they made to them the proposal which they did before they were besieged—to be neutral, according to the terms of that compact—in consequence of their not receiving it, they considered that on the strength of their own just wish they were now released from covenant with them, and had received evil at their hands. Accordingly, bringing each of them forward, and asking the same question,

 Whether they had done the Lacedaemonians and allies any service in the war,

 when they said they had not, they led them away and killed them, not excepting one.

 Of the Plataeans themselves they slew not less than two hundred, and of the Athenians twenty-five, who were besieged with them;

 the women they sold as slaves. As for the city, the Thebans gave it for about a year to some of the Megareans to inhabit, who had been banished by party influence, and to such of the Plataeans on their own side as still survived. Afterwards they razed the whole of it to the ground, from the very foundations, and built to the sacred precinct of Juno an inn two hundred feet square, with rooms all round, above and below, making use of the roofs and doors of the Plataeans; and with the rest of the furniture, in brass and iron, that was

 Or, as Bloomfield and Göller render it,

 whatever movable materials there were in the wall;

 referring to the metal cramps by which the copingstones were fastened. But though lead and iron are mentioned as having been used for that purpose, (see I. p. 93. 6,) they do not bring forward any instance of brass having been used with them; nor does it seem probable that such would be the case. I have therefore followed Poppo, Haack, and others, in supposing, that as the wood work in the new building was taker from the houses in the town, a similar use was made of the iron and bras, implements, which must also surely have been found there. At least it is very difficult to imagine, with Göller, that they had been all used up by the garrison during the siege. And instead of the opposition which he says is intended between the wood in the houses and the metal in the wall, the use of the ἄλλοις appears rather to imply that the rafters, doors, and metal implements were all taken from the same quarter. within the wall, they made couches and dedicated them to Juno, building also in her honour a stone chapel of one hundred feet square. The land they confiscated, and let out for ten years, its occupiers being Thebans.

 And nearly throughout the whole business it was on account of the Thebans that the Lacedaemonians were so averse to the Plataeans; for they considered them to be of service for the war which had then but recently broken out.

 Such then was the end of Plataea, in the ninety-third year after they became allies of the Athenians. Now the forty ships of the Peloponnesians which had gone to the relief of the Lesbians, (and which were flying, at the time we referred to them, across the open sea, and were pursued by the Athenians, and caught in a storm off Crete, and from that point had been dispersed,) on reaching the Peloponnese, found at Cyllene thirteen ships of the Leucadians and Ambraciots, with Brasidas son of Tellis, who had lately arrived as counsellor to Alcidas.

 For the Lacedaemonians wished, as they had failed in saving Lesbos, to make their fleet more numerous, and to sail to Corcyra, which was in a state of sedition; as the Athenians were stationed at Naupactus with only twelve ships; and in order that they might have the start of them, before any larger fleet reinforced them from Athens. So Brasidas and Alcidas proceeded to make preparations for these measures. For the Corcyraeans began their sedition on the return home of the prisoners taken in the sea-fights off Epidamnus, who had been sent back by the Corinthians, nominally on the security of eight hundred talents given for them by their proxeni, but in reality, because they had consented to bring over Corcyra to the Corinthians. These men then were intriguing, by visits to each of the citizens, to cause the revolt of the city from the Athenians.

 On the arrival of a ship from Athens and another from Corinth, with envoys on board, and on their meeting for a conference, the Corcyraeans voted to continue allies of the Athenians according to their agreement, but to be on friendly terms with the Peloponnesians, as they had formerly been.

 Now there was one Pithias, a

 i. e. an individual who of his own accord took upon himself to look after the interests of any particular foreign nation, without being recognised by that people, and having his appointment entered in the public records. Or as Böckh thinks, without being publicly appointed by his own country See note on II. 29. 1. volunteer proxenus of the Athenians, and the leader of the popular party;

 him these men brought to trial, on a charge of enslaving Corcyra to the Athenians. Having been acquitted, he brought to trial in return the five richest individuals of their party, charging them with cutting stakes in the ground sacred to Jupiter and to [the hero] Alcinous;

 the penalty affixed being a stater for every stake. When they had been convicted, and, owing to the amount of the penalty, were sitting as suppliants in the temples, that they might be allowed to pay it by instalments, Pithias, who was a member of the council also, persuades that body to enforce the law.

 So when they were excluded from all hope by the severity of the law, and at the same time heard that Pithias was likely, while he was still in the council, to persuade the populace to hold as friends and foes the same as the Athenians did, they conspired together, and took daggers, and, having suddenly entered the council, assassinated Pithias and others, both counsellors and private persons, to the number of sixty. Some few, however, of the same party as Pithias, took refuge on board the Athenian trireme, which was still there. Having perpetrated this deed, and summoned the Corcyraeans to an assembly, they told them that this was the best thing for them, and that so they would be least in danger of being enslaved by the Athenians; and they moved, that in future they should receive neither party, except coming in a quiet manner with a single ship, but should consider a larger force as hostile. As they moved, so also they compelled them to adopt their motion.

 They likewise sent immediately ambassadors to Athens, to show, respecting what had been done, that it was for their best interests, and to prevail on the refugees there to adopt no measure prejudicial to them that there might not be any reaction. On their arrival, the Athenians arrested as revolutionists both the ambassadors and all who were persuaded by them, and lodged them in custody in Aegina.

 In the mean time, on the arrival of a Corinthian ship and some Lacedaemonian envoys, the dominant party of the Corcyraeans attacked the commonalty, and defeated them in battle.

 When night came on, the commons took refuge in the citadel, and on the eminences in the city, and there established themselves in a body, having possession also of the Hyllaic harbour; while the other party occupied the market-place, where most of them dwelt, with the harbour adjoining it, looking towards the mainland. The next day they had a few skirmishes, and both parties sent about into the country, inviting the slaves, and offering them freedom. The greater part of them joined the commons as allies; while the other party was reinforced by eight hundred auxiliaries from the continent. After the interval of a day, a battle was again fought, and the commons gained the victory, having the advantage both in strength of position and in numbers: the women also boldly assisted them, throwing at the enemy with the filing from the houses, and standing the brunt of the mêlée beyond what could have been expected from their nature.

 About twllight the rout of the oligarchical party as effected; and fearing that the commons might carry the arsenal at the first assault, and put them to the sword, they fired the houses round about the market-place, and the lodging-houses, to stop their advance, sparing neither their own nor other people's; so that much property belonging to the merchants was consumed, and the whole city was in danger of being destroyed, if, in addition to the fire, there had been a wind blowing on it.

 After ceasing from the engagement, both sides remained quiet, and kept guard during the night. On victory declaring for the commons, the Corinthian ship stole out to sea; while the greater part of the auxiliaries passed over unobserved to the continent. The day following, Nicostratus son of Diitrephes, a general of the Athenians, came to their assistance from Naupactus with twelve ships and five hundred heavy-armed, and wished to negotiate a settlement, persuading them to agree with each other to bring to trial the ten chief authors of the sedition, (who immediately fled,) and for the rest to dwell in peace, having made an arrangement with each other, and with the Athenians, to have the same foes and friends.

 After effecting this he was going to sail away; but the leaders of the commons urged him to leave them five of his ships, that their adversaries might be less on the move; and they would themselves man and send with him an equal number of theirs He consented to do so, and they proceeded to enlist their adversaries for the ships.

 They, fearing that they should be sent off to Athens, seated themselves [as suppliants] in the temple of the Dioscuri;

 while Nicostratus was trying to persuade them to rise, and to encourage them. When he did not prevail on them, the commons, having armed themselves on this pretext, alleged that they had no good intentions, [as was evident] from their mistrust in not sailing with them; and removed their arms from their houses, and would have despatched some of them whom they met with, if Nicostratus had not prevented it.

 The rest, seeing what was going on, seated themselves as suppliants in the temple of Juno, their number amounting to not less than four hundred. But the commons, being afraid of their making some new attempt, persuaded them to rise, and transferred them to the island in front of the temple, and provisions were sent over there for them. When the sedition was at this point, on the fourth or fifth day after the transfer of the men to the island, the ships of the Peleponnesians, three-and-fifty in number, came up from Cyllene, having been stationed there since their return from Ionia. The commander of them, as before, was Alcidas, Brasidas sailing with him as counsellor. After coming to anchor at Sybota, a port on the mainland, as soon as it was morning they sailed towards Corcyra. The Corcyraeans, being in great confusion, and alarmed both at the state of things in the city and at the advance of the enemy, at once proceeded to equip sixty vessels, and to send them out, as they were successively manned, against the enemy; though the Athenians advised them to let them sail out first, and afterwards to follow themselves with all their ships together.

 On their vessels coming up to the enemy in this scattered manner, two immediately went over to them, while in others the crews were fighting amongst themselves, and there was no order in their measures.

 The Peloponnesians, seeing their confusion, drew up twenty of their ships against the Corcyraeans, and the remainder against the twelve of the Athenians, amongst which were the two celebrated vessels, Salaminia and Paralus. The Corcyraeans, coming to the attack in bad order, and by few ships at a time, were distressed through their own arrangements; while the Athenians, fearing the enemy's numbers and the chance of their surrounding them, did not attack their whole fleet, or even the centre of the division opposed to themselves, but took it in flank, and sunk one ship. After this, when the Peloponnesians had formed in a circle, they began to sail round them, and endeavoured to throw them into confusion.

 The division which was opposed to the Corcyraeans perceiving this, and fearing that the same thing might happen as had at Naupactus, advanced to their support.

 Thus the whole united fleet simultaneously attacked the Athenians, who now began to retire, rowing astern; at the same time wishing the vessels of the Corcyraeans to retreat first, while they themselves drew off as leisurely as possible, and while the enemy were still ranged against them.

 The sea-fight then, having been of this character, ended at sun-set. The Corcyraeans, fearing that the enemy, on the strength of his victory, might sail against the city, and either rescue the men in the island, or proceed to some other violent measures, carried the men over again to the sanctuary of Juno, and kept the city under guard.

 The Peloponnesians, however, though victorious in the engagement, did not dare to sail against the city, but withdrew with thirteen of the Corcyraean vessels to the continent, whence they had put out.

 The next day they advanced none the more against the city, though the inhabitants were in great confusion, and though Brasidas, it is said, advised Alcidas to do so, but was not equal to him in authority; but they landed on the promontory of Leucimne, and ravaged the country. Meanwhile, the commons of the Corcyraeans, being very much alarmed lest the fleet should sail against them, entered into negotiation with the suppliants and the rest for the preservation of the city. And some of them they persuaded to go on board the ships; for [notwithstanding the general dismay] they still manned thirty, in expectation of the enemy's advance against them.

 But the Peloponnesians, after ravaging the land till mid-day, sailed away: and at night-fall the approach of sixty Athenian ships from Leucas was signaled to them, which the Athenians had sent with Eurymedon son of Thucles, as commander, on hearing of the sedition, and of the fleet about to go to Corcyra with Alcidas. The Peloponnesians then immediately proceeded homeward by night with all haste, passing along shore; and having hauled their ships over the isthmus of Leucas, that they might not be seen doubling it, they sailed back.

 The Corcyraeans, on learning the approach of the Athenian fleet and the retreat of the enemy, took and brought into the city the Messenians, who before had been without the walls: and having ordered the ships they had manned to sail round into the Hyllaic harbour, while they were going round, they put to death any of their opponents they might have happened to seize; and afterwards despatched, as they landed them from the ships, all that they had persuaded to go on board. They also went to the sanctuary of Juno, and persuaded about fifty men to take their trial, and condemned them all to death.

 The majority of the suppliants, who had not been prevailed on by them, when they saw what was being done, slew one another there on the sacred ground; while some hanged themselves on the trees, and others destroyed themselves as they severally could.

 During seven days that Eurymedon stayed after his arrival with his sixty ships, the Corcyraeans were butchering those of their countrymen whom they thought hostile to them; bringing their accusations, indeed, against those only who were for putting down the democracy; but some were slain for private enmity also, and others for money owed 'them by those who had borrowed it. Every mode of death was thus had recourse to;

 and whatever ordinarily happens in such a state of things, all happened then, and still more For father murdered son, and they were dragged out of the sanctuaries, or slain in them; while in that of Bacchus some were walled up and perished. So savagely did the sedition proceed; while it appeared to do so all the more from its being amongst the earliest. For afterwards, even the whole of Greece, so to say, was convulsed; struggles being every where made by the popular leaders to call in the Athenians, by the oligarchical party, the Lacedaemonians.

 Here, as in I. 36. 3, the participle and the finite verb are made to answer to each other, οὐκ ἄν ἐχόντων — ἐπορίζοντο, whereas it should have been either οὐκ ἄν εἶχον πρόφασιν — ἐπορίζοντο, or οὐκ ἄν ἐχόντων — τῶν ἐπαγωγῶν ποριζομένων. 

 

— Arnold. The only way to avoid this confusion of constructions would be to understand ἐχόντων and ἑτοίμων again after πολεμουμένων. 

 And as they would have had no pretext for calling them in, nor have been prepared to do it, in time of peace, but were so in time of war,—occasions of inviting them were easily supplied, when this war had broken out.

 But from the fact of no commentator (so far as I am aware) having adopted this method, there are probably greater objections to it than, I confess, present themselves to my own mind. Now they would have had no pretext for calling them in, nor have been prepared to do so, in time of peace. But when pressed by war, and when an alliance also was maintained by both parties for the injury of their opponents and for their own gain therefrom, occasions of inviting them were easily supplied to such as wished to effect any revolution.

 And many dreadful things befell the cities through this sedition, which occur, and will always do so, as long as human nature is the same, but

 For a similar use of μᾶλλον compare IV. 19. 7, εἴτε καὶ ἐκπολιορκηθέντες μᾶλλον ἂν χειρωθεῖεν in a more violent or milder form, and varying in their phenomena, as the several variations of circumstances may in each case present themselves. For in peace and prosperity both communities and individuals have better feelings, through not falling into

 Literally

 compulsory,

 i. e. which compells a man to do what he would otherwise not think of. urgent needs; whereas war, by taking away the free supply of daily wants is a violent master, and assimilates most men's tempers to their present condition, The states ten were thus torn by sedition, and the later instances of it in any part, from having heard what had been done before, exhibited largely an excessive refinement of ideas, both in the eminent cunning of their plans, and the monstrous cruelty of their vengeance.

 The ordinary meaning of words was chanced by them as they thought proper. For reckless daring was regarded as courage tat was true to its friends; prudent delay, as specious cowardice; moderation, as a cloak for unmanliness; being intelligent in every thing, as being useful for nothing.

 Frantic violence was assigned to the manly character; cautious plotting was considered a specious excuse for declining the contest. The advocate for cruel measures was always trusted; while his opponent was suspected. He that plotted against another, if successful, was reckoned clever; he that suspected a plot, still cleverer; but he that forecasted for escaping the necessity of all such things, was regarded as one who broke up his party, and was afraid of his adversaries.

 In a word, the man was commended who anticipated one going to do an evil deed, or who persuaded to it one who had no thought of it. Moreover, kindred became a tie less close than party, because the latter was more ready for unscrupulous audacity. For such associations have nothing to do with any benefit from established laws, but are formed in opposition to those institutions by a spirit of rapacity.

 Again, their mutual grounds of confidence they confirmed not so much by any reference to the divine law as by fellowship in some act of lawlessness. The fair professions of their adversaries they received with a cautious eye to their actions, if they were stronger than themselves, and not with a spirit of generosity. To be avenged on another was deemed of greater consequence than to escape being first injured oneself.

 As for oaths, if in any case exchanged with a view to a reconciliation, being taken by either party with regard to their immediate necessity, they only held good so long as they had no resources from any other quarter; but he that first, when occasion offered, took courage [to break them], if he saw his enemy off his guard, wreaked his vengeance on him with greater pleasure for his confidence, than he would have done in an open manner; taking into account both the safety of the plan, and the fact that by taking a treacherous advantage of him he also won a prize for cleverness. And the majority of men, when dishonest, more easily get the name of talented an, when simple, that of good, and of the one hear ashamed, while of the her hey are proud. Now the cause of all these things was now proper pursued for the gratification of covetousness and ambition and the consequent violence parties when once engaged in contentio.

 For the leaders in the cities, having a specious profession on each side, putting forward, respectively, the political equality of the people, or a moderate aristocracy, while in word they served the common interests, in truth they made them their prizes. And while struggling by every means to obtain an advantage over each other, they dared and carried out the most dreadful deeds; heaping on still greater vengeance, not only so far s was just and expedient for he state, but it the measure of what pleasing to either party in each successive case: an whether by an unjust sentence of condemnation, or on

 Or, χειρί may be taken by itself, in opposition to μετὰ ψήφου ἀδίκου καταγνώσεως: but the rhythm of the sentence appears better with the ether construction. gaining the ascendency by the strong hand, they were ready to glut the animosity they felt at the moment. Thus piety was in fashion with neither party; but those who had the luck to effect some odious purpose under fair pretences were the more highly spoken of. The neutrals amongst the citizens were destroyed by both parties : either because they did not join them in their quarrel, or for envy that they should so escape. Thus every kind of villany arose in Greece from these seditions. Simplicity which is a very large ingredient in a noble nature, was laughed down and disappeared; and mutual opposition of feeling, with a want of confidence, prevailed to a great extent.

 For there was neither promise that could be depended on, nor oath that struck them with fear, t put an end to their strife; but all being in their calculations more strongly inclined to despair of any thing proving trustworthy, they looked forward to their own escape from suffering more easily than they could place confidence [in arrangements with others].

 And the men of more homely wit, generally speaking, had the advantage; for through fearing their own deficiency and the cleverness of their opponents, lest thy might be worsted in words, and be first plotted against by means of the versatility of their enemy's genius, they proceeded boldly to deeds.

 Whereas their opponents, arrogantly thinking that they should be aware beforehand, and that there was no need for their securing by action what they could by stratagem, were unguarded and more often ruined. It was in Corcyra then that most of these things were first ventured on; both the deeds which men who were governed with a spirit of insolence, rather than of moderation, by those who afterwards afforded them an opportunity of vengeance, would do as the retaliating party; or which those who wished to rid themselves of their accustomed poverty, and passionately desired the possession of their neighbours' goods, might unjustly resolve on; or which those who had begin the struggle, not from covetousness, but on a more equal fooling, might savagely and ruthlessly proceed to, chiefly through being carried away by the rudeness of their anger.

 Thus the course of life being at that time thrown into confusion in the city, human nature, which is wont to do wrong even in spite of the laws, having then got the mastery of the law, gladly showed itself to be unrestrained in passion, above reward for justice, and an enemy to all superiority. They would not else have preferred vengeance to region, and gain to innocence; in which state envy would have had no power to hurt them.

 And so men presume in their acts of vengeance to be the first to violate those common laws on such questions, from which all have a hope secured to them of being themselves rescued from misfortune; and they will not allow them to remain, in case of any one's ever being in danger and in need of some of them. Such then were the passions which the Corcyraeans in the city indulged towards one another, being the first that did so. And Eurymedon and the Athenians sailed away with their ships;

 after which the Corcyraean exiles, (for five hundred of them had escaped,) having taken some forts that were on the mainland, were masters of their own territory on the opposite coast, and sallying forth from it, plundered those in the island, and did them much damage, a violent famine being produced in the city. They also sent embassies to Lacedaemon and Corinth about their restoration.

 When they met with no success, they afterwards got some boats and auxiliaries and crossed over to the island, to the number of six hundred in all; and having burnt their boats, that they might have no hope from any thing but the command of the country, they went up to the hill Istone, and after building a fort on it, began to annoy those in the city, and were in the mean time masters of the country. At the close of the same summer the Athenians despatched twenty ships to Sicily, with Laches son of Melanopus, and Charceades son of Euphiletus, in command of them.

 For the Syracusans and Leontines had gone to war with each other; the Syracusans having, with the exception of Camarina, all the Dorian cities in alliance with them—for indeed these had joined the Lacedaemonian confederacy at the commencement of the war, though they had not taken any part in it with them—while the Leontines had the Chalcidian cities, and Camarina. In Italy the Locrians were on the side of the Syracusans; the Rhegians, on that of the Leontines, in consequence of their affinity to them.

 So the allies of the Leontines sent to Athens, both on the ground of their former confederacy with them and because they were Ionians, and urged the Athenians to send them a fleet, for they were excluded by the Syracusans from the use both of land and sea.

 Accordingly the Athenians sent it, on the pretence of their relationship, but really from a wish that no corn might be brought thence to the Peloponnese; and to make an experiment whether it were possible for them to bring Sicily into subjection to themselves.

 Having established themselves therefore at Rhegium in Italy, they began the operations of the war in concert with their allies. And so the summer ended. The following winter the plague a second time attacked the Athenians, having indeed never entirely left them, though there had been some abatement of it.

 It lasted the second time not less than a year—the former attack having lasted two—so that nothing reduced the power of the Athenians more than this.

 For not less than four thousand four hundred heavy-armed in the ranks died of it, and three hundred of the equestrian order, with a number of the multitude that was never ascertained.

 It was at that time also that the Numerous earthquakes happened at Athens, Euboea, and Boeotia, particularly at Orchomenos in the last-named country. During the same winter the Athenians in Sicily and the Rhegians made an expedition with thirty ships against the islands of Aeolus; for in summer it was impossible to invade them, owing to their want of water.

 They are occupied by the Liparaean colony from Cnidos, who live in one of the which is of no great extent, called Lipara, and proceed that to cultivate the rest, namely, Didyme, Strongyle, and Hiera.

 Now the people in those parts think that in Hiera Vulcan works as a smith; because it is seen to emit abundance of fire by night, and of smoke by day. These islands lie opposite the coasts of the Sicels and Messanians, and were in alliance with the Syracusans.

 The Athenians ravaged their territory, and when they did not surrender, sailed back to Rhegium. And so the winter ended, and the fifth year of of which Thucydides wrote the history. The following summer the Peloponnesians and their allies proceeded as far as the Isthmus for the invasion of Attica, under the command of Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians; but on the occurrence of numerous earthquakes, they turned back again, and no invasion was made.

 About this period, when the earthquakes were so at, the sea at Orobiae in Euboea, having retired from as then the line of coast, and afterwards returned with swell, invaded a portion of the city, and partly init, though it also partly subsided; and so that is now sea was before land.

 It also destroyed the inhabitants, excepting such as could run up first to the higher parts of the There was a similar inundation too at Atalanta, the island off the Opuntian Locri, which carried away a part of built by the Athenians, and wrecked one of two ships re drawn up on the beach.

 At Peparethus too there treat of the sea, though no inundation followed; and an earthquake threw down a part of the wall, with the townhall few houses besides.

 The cause of this, in my own opinion, is, that where the shock of the earthquake has been most violent, there it drives the sea back, and this suddenly coming on again with a violent rush causes the inundation. But without an earthquake I do not think that such an occurrence would ever happen. During the same summer different parties, as they might severally happen, made war in Sicily; both the Siceliots themselves against each other, and the Athenians in concert with their allies; but I shall [only] mention the most memorable actions achieved by the Athenians and their allies, or against the Athenians by the enemy.

 Charaeades then, the Athenian commander, having already been killed in war by the Syracusans, Laches, who was now in sole command of the fleet, turned his arms, in concert with his allies, against Myle, a town belonging to the Messanians. Now there were two divisions of the Messanians in garrison at Mylae, and they had laid an ambush for the party coming from their ships.

 But the Athenians and their allies routed the troops in ambush, and slew many of them, and having assaulted the fortifications, compelled them to surrender the citadel, and to march with them against Messana.

 Afterwards, on the attack of the Athenians and their allies, the Messanians too capitulated, giving hostages and

 Satisfying the Athenians in all other points.

 Lit.

 presenting all other things of such a nature as to be satisfactory.

 

— Arnold. all other securities. The same summer the Athenians despatched thirty ships to cruise about the Peloponnese, under the command of Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes, and Procles son of Theodorus, and sixty ships and two thousand heavy-armed against Melos, under the command of Nicias son of Niceratus.

 For as the Melians were islanders, and yet would not submit to them nor join their confederacy, they wished to reduce them.

 When, however, they did not surrender to them on the wasting of their territory, they sailed to Oropus, on the coast opposite Attica; and having landed at night, the heavy-armed immediately marched from their ships to Tanagra in Boeotia;

 while the Athenians in the city, on a given signal, met them at the same place by land in full force, under the command of Hipponicus son of Callias, and Eurymedon son of Thucles.

 Having pitched their camp for that day in the territory of Tanagra, they laid it waste, and passed the night there. The next day, after defeating in battle those of the Tanagraeans and the Thebans who had come out against them, and after taking some arms, and erecting a trophy, they returned, one party to the city, the other to their fleet.

 And Nicias, with his sixty ships, coasted along and ravaged the maritime parts of Locris, and then returned home. About this time the Lacedaemonians prepared to found their colony of Heraclea, in Trachiniae, with the following purpose.

 The Melians form, in all, three tribes, the Paralians, Hiereans, and Trachinians. Of these, the Trachinians, having been reduced to great weakness by the Aetaeans, who border on them, intended at first to give themselves up to the Athenians; but afterwards, fearing that they could not be trusted by them, they sent to Lacedaemon, having chosen Tisamenus as their envoy.

 They were joined in the embassy by the Dorians also, the mother-state of the Lacedaemonians, with the same petition; for they, too, were much injured by the Aetaeans.

 On hearing their request, the Lacedaemonians determined to send out this colony, from a wish to assist both the Trachinians and the Dorians. Besides, they thought the town would be placed advantageously for them with respect to the war with the Athenians; for a fleet might be equipped so as to have a short passage to Euboea, and it would be useful for marching to Thrace. Indeed on all accounts they were anxious to found the place. They first consulted therefore the god at Delphi;

 and on his advising them to do it, they despatched the settlers, taken both from their own citizens and from the Perioeci, and gave permission to any of the rest of the Greeks that wished to accompany them, except Ionians, Achaeans, and some other races. Three of the Lacedaemonians led them as founders of the colony, Leon, Alcidas, and Damagon.

 When they had established themselves in the country, they fortified anew the city which is now called Heraclea, distant about forty stades from Thermopylae, and twenty from the sea. They also provided themselves with docks, beginning to build the at Thermopylae, just by the pass, that they might the more easily be defended by them. When this town was being thus jointly founded, the Athenians were at first alarmed, thinking that it was being set up chiefly for the annoyance of Euboea, because the passage to Cinaeum in that island is a short one. The event, however, proved contrary to their expectations for no danger arose from it. And the reason was this.

 The Thessalians, who had dominion in these parts, and to the injury of whose territory the place was being founded, fearing they might prove very powerful neighbours, continually harassed and made war upon the new settlers, till they wore down their strength, though at first they had been very numerous; for as the Lacedaemonians were the founders of the town, every one went to it with confidence, thinking it a place of security. It was, however, the Lacedaemonian officers themselves, who went to it, that chiefly contributed to ruining its interests, and reducing it to a scanty population, by frightening away the greater part, and governing harshly, and in some cases not fairly, so that their neighbours then prevailed over them more easily. The same summer, and about the same time that the Athenians were detained at Melos, the forces on board the thirty ships that were cruising about the Peloponnese first of all laid an ambush at Ellomenus in Leucadia, and cut off some garrison troops; and afterwards came against Leucas with a larger force, and with all the Acarnanians, who accompanied them in a body, except the Aeniadae, and with the Zacynthians and Cephallenians, and fifteen ships of the Corcyraeans.

 The Leucadians, on the wasting of their territory, both without and within the isthmus, on which stands Leucas and the temple of Apollo, being overpowered by such numbers, remained quiet; while the Acarnanians requested Demosthenes, the general of the Athenians, to cut them off by a wall, thinking that they might then easily take them by storm, and so be rid of a city which was always hostile to them.

 But Demosthenes was persuaded at the same time by the Messenians that it was a fine opportunity for him, with so large an army collected together, to attack the Aetolians, who were hostile to Naupactus, and by reducing whom he would easily win for Athens the rest of the continent in these parts.

 For they represented to him that the nation of the Aetolians, though numerous and warlike, were yet not difficult to subdue before succours reached them, as they lived in unfortified villages, and those far apart, and used but light armour.

 And they advised him to attack in the first place the Apodotians, next the Ophioneans, and after them the Eurytanians, which are the largest division of the nation, speaking, it is said, the most unintelligible language, and being cannibals; for if these were subdued, the rest would readily surrender. He consented to do so, out of regard for the Messenians, and still more because he thought, that without employing the forces of Athens, with only continental tribes as his allies, and with the Aetolians, he would be able to go by land against the Boeotians, through the Locri Ozolae to Cytinium in Doris, keeping Parnassus on his right hand till he reached the Phocians, who, he thought, would eagerly join him, for the friendship they had always borne the Athenians, or might be brought over by force; and to Phocis Boeotia is at once the bordering state. Starting therefore with all his armament from Leucas, in opposition to the wishes of the Acarnanians, lie coasted along to Sollium.

 There he communicated his plan to the Acarnanians; and when they did not assent to it in consequence of his refusal to invest Leucas, he himself with the remainder of the force, the Cephallenians, Messenians, Zacynthians, and the three hundred

 i. e. the heavy-armed soldiers who served on board ship, answering to our marines. 

 epibatae from his own ships, (for the fifteen Corcyraean vessels had gone away,) made an expedition against the Aetolians, having his head-quarters at Aeneon in Locris.

 Now the Locri Ozolae were allies or the Athenians, and were to meet them in full force in the heart of the country: for as they bordered on the Aetolians, and were similarly equipped, they were thought likely to prove of great service in acting with them, from their acquaintance both with the Aetolian mode of fighting and with the localities. After bivouacking with the army in the sacred precinct of the Nemean Jupiter, in which Hesiod the poet is said to have been killed by the people of this country, an oracle having before declared that he should meet with this fate at Nemea; in the morning he set out and marched into Aetolia.

 On the first day he took Potidanea; on the second, Crocyleum; and on the third, Tichium, where he halted, and sent off his booty to Eupalium in Locris: for he intended, when he had subdued the other parts, to make a subsequent expedition against the Ophionians, if they would not surrender, after returning to Naupactus.

 But the Aetolians were both aware or these preparations when he first formed his designs against them, and when the army had invaded their country they came to the rescue with a great force, all of them, so that even the most distant of the Ophionians, who stretch towards the Melian Gulf, the Borniensians and Calliensians, joined in bringing aid. Now the Messenians gave Demosthenes the following advice, as they also did at first. Assuring him that the reduction of the Aetolians was easy, they urged him to go as quickly as possible against their villages, and not wait till the whole people should unite and oppose him, but to endeavour successively to make himself master of each village

 Or,

 as it came in his way.

 Literally,

 at his feet.

 Compare He rodotus, 3. 79, πάντα τινὰ τῶν μάγων τὸν ἐν ποσὶ γινόμενον. before him.

 Being thus persuaded by them, and relying on his fortune, because nothing ever went against him, without waiting for those who should have reinforced him (for he was most in want of light-armed dartmen) he advanced for Aegitium, and took it by assault, the inhabitants flying before him, and posting themselves on the hills round the town; for it stood on high ground, at the distance of about eighty stades from the sea.

 The Aetolians (for they had now come to the rescue of Aegitium) charged the Athenians and their allies, running down from the hills in different directions, and plied them with darts; retreating when the Athenian force advanced against them, and pressing it close when it retired. And for a long time this was the character of the engagement—repeated pursuing and retreating—in both of which the Athenians had the worse. Now so long as they saw that their archers had their arrows and were able to use them, they continued to resist; for, when harassed by the bowmen, the Aetolians, being a light-armed force, retired. But when, after the fall of their leader, the archers were dispersed, and they themselves distressed by enduring for a long time the same labour, and the $Atolians were pressing hard on them, and pouring their darts on them; then indeed they turned and fled, and falling into pathless ravines and places with which they were unacquainted, were cut off: for the guide who showed them the way, Chromon the Messenian, had been killed.

 And the Aetolians, still plying them with missiles, by their rapid movements (for they are swift of foot and light-armed) took many of them there in the rout, and put them to the sword; but the greater part missing their way and rushing into the forest, from which there were no roads out, they brought fire and burnt it round them.

 Indeed the Athenian forces were subjected to every form of flight and death, and it was with difficulty that the survivors escaped to the sea and to Oeneon in Locris, the same place from which they had set out.

 Great numbers of the allies were slain, and of the Athenians themselves about a hundred and twenty heavy-armed—so many in number, and all in the prime of their youth. These were the best men of the city of Athens that fell during this war. One of the generals also, namely, Procles, was slain.

 Having taken up their dead under truce, and retired to Naupactus, they afterwards went with their ships to Athens. But Demosthenes staved behind in the neighbourhood of Naupactus and those parts, being afraid of the Athenins in sequence of what had been done. About the same period the Athenians on the coast of Sicily sailed to Locris, and in a descent which they made on the country, defeated those of the Locrians who came against them, and took a guard-fort which stood on the river Halex. The same summer the Aetolians, having before [the invasion of their country] sent as envoys to Corinth and Lacedaemon, Tolophus the Ophionean, Boriades the Eurytanian, and Tisander the Apodotian, persuaded them to send them an army to attack Naupactus, because it had brought the Athenians against them.

 And the Lacedaemonians despatched about autumn three thousand heavy-armed of the allies; five hundred of whom were from Heraclea, their newly founded city in Trachis. Eurylochus, a Spartan, had the command of the force, accompanied by Macarius and Menedaeus, who were also Spartans; When the army had assembled at Delphi, Eurylochus sent a herald to the Locri Ozole; for the route to Naupactus was through their territory, and moreover he wished to make them revolt from the Athenians.

 Those amongst the Locrians who most forwarded his views were the Amphissians, who were alarmed in consequence of the enmity of the Phocians. These first gave hostages themselves, and persuaded the rest to do so, in their fear of the invading army; first the Myoneans, who were their neighbours, (for on this side Locris is most difficult to enter,) then the Ipneans, Messapians, Tritaens, Chalaeans, Tolophonians, Hessians, and Oeantheans. All these joined the expedition also. The Olpnaean gave hostages, but did not accompany them; while the Hyaeans refused to give hostages, till they took a village belonging to them, called Polis. When every thing was prepared, and he had placed the hostages at Cytinium in Doris, he advanced with his army against Naupactus, through the territory of the Locrians; and on his march took Oeneon, one of their towns, and Eupalium; for they refused to surrender.

 When they had reached the Naupactian territory, and the Aetolians also had now come to their aid, they ravaged the country, and took the

 We have no term exactly answering to the Greek προαστεῖον or,

 approach to the city;

 for, as Arnold observes on IV. 69. 5, it

 was not what we call a suburb, but rather an open space like the parks in London, partly planted with trees, and containing public walks, colonnades, temples, and the houses of some of the principal citizens. It was used as a ground for reviews of the army and for public games. At Rome the Campus Martius was exactly what the Greeks call προαστεῖον. 

 suburb of the capital, which was unfortified. They also went against and took Molyenium, which, though a colony from Corinth, was subject to the Athenians.

 Now Demosthenes, the Athenian, (for after what had happened in Aetolia, he was still in the neighbourhood of Naupactus) having previous notice of the armament, and being alarmed for the town, went and persuaded the Acarnanians (though with difficulty, on account of his retreat from Leucas) to go to the relief of Naupactus.

 Accordingly they sent with him on board his ships a thousand heavy-armed, who threw themselves into the place and saved it. For the walls being extensive, and the garrison small, there was reason to fear that they might not hold out.

 When Eurylochus and his colleagues found that this force had entered the town, and that it was impossible to take it by storm, they withdrew, not towards the Peloponnese, but to Aeolis,

 i. e. (as Arnold explains it, after Wasse, Palmer, and Kruse,) the district once called Aeolis was now called by the names of the two principal towns in it, Calydon and Pleuron. Poppo and Göller understand it as the ancient came of Calydon alone. which is now called Calydon and Pleuron, with the places in that quarter, and to Proschium in Aetolia.

 For the Ambraciots had come to them, and urged them to make, in concert with themselves, an attack upon the Amphilochian Argos and the rest of that country, and upon Acarnania at the same time; telling them that if they made themselves masters of these countries, the whole of the continent would be united in alliance with the Lacedaemonians.

 So Eurylochus consented, and having dismissed the Aetolians, remained quiet with his army in that neighbourhood, till he should have to assist the Ambraciots, on their taking the field before Argos. And so the summer ended. The following winter, the Athenians in Sicily having marched with their Grecian allies, and as many of the Sieels as joined them in the war—being either subject by force to the Syracusans or allies who had revolted from them—against Inessa, the Sieel town, the citadel of which was held by the Syracusans, attacked it, and, not being able to take it, retired.

 On their return, the Syracusans from the citadel fell on the allies as they were retiring somewhat after the Athenians, and routed a division of their army, and killed no small number.

 After this, Laches and the Athenians, with the fleet, made some descents upon the Locrian territory, by the river Coecinus, and defeated in battle those of the Locrians who came out against them with Proxenus the son of Capaton, about three hundred in number, and having taken some arms, departed. The same winter also the Athenians purified Delos, in obedience, as they professed, to a certain oracle. For Pisistratus the tyrant had also purified it before; not the whole of the island, but as much of it as was within sight of the temple. At this time, however, the whole of it was purified in the following manner.

 All the sepulchres of those who had died in Delos they removed, and commanded that in future no one should either die in the island or bear a child, but that [in such cases all should] be carried across to Rhenea. (This Rhenea is so short a distance from Delos, that Polycrates the tyrant of Samos, after being powerful at sea for a considerable time, and ruling over the rest of the islands, and taking Rhenea, dedicated it to the Delian Apollo, by connecting it with Delos by a chain.)

 It was at this time too, after the purification, that the Athenians first celebrated the quinquennial festival of the Delian games. There had been, however, even in very early times, a great assembly of the Ionians and the neighbouring islanders held at Delos; for they used to come to the feast with their wives and children, as the Ionians now do to the Ephesian festivals, and gymnastic and musical contests were held, and the different cities took up bands of dancers.

 Homer shows most clearly that such was the case, in the following verses, taken from a hymn to Apollo.

 Anon to Delos, Phoebus, wouldst thou come, Still most delighting in thine island-home; Where the long-robed Ionians thronging meet, With wives and children, at thy hallow'd seat; With buffets, dance, and song extol thy name, And win thy smile upon their solemn game. 

 That there was a musical contest also, and that they went to take part in it, he shows again in the following verses, taken from the same hymn. For after mentioning the Delian dance of the women, he ends his praise of the god with these verses, in which he also makes mention of himself.

 Now be Apollo kind, and Dian too; And ye, fair Delian damsels, all adieu! But in your memory grant me still a home; And oft as to your sacred isle may come A pilgrim care-worn denizen of earth, And ask, while joining in your social mirth, "Maidens, of all the bards that seek your coast, Who sings the sweetest, and who charms you most?

 Then answer one and all, with gracious smile, A blind old man who lives in Chios' rocky isle. 

 Such evidence does Homer afford of there having been, even in early times, a great assembly and festival at Delos. But afterwards, though the islanders and the Athenians sent the bands of dancers with sacrifices, the games and the greater part of the observances were abolished—as is most probable, through adversity—until the Athenians held the games at that time, with horse-races, which before had not been usual. The same winter the Ambraciots, as they had promised Eurylochus when they retained his army, marched forth against the Amphilochian Argos with three thousand heavy-armed; and entering the Argive territory, occupied Olpae, a strong-hold on a hill near the sea, which the Acarnanians had once fortified, and used as their common place of meeting for judicial purposes; its distance from the city of Argos on the coast being about twenty-five stades.

 Now some of the Acarnanians went to the relief of Argos, while others encamped in Amphilochia, in the place called

 Corresponding exactly to our

 Wells.

 Crenae, being on the watch to prevent the Peloponnesians with Eurylochus passing through unobserved to the Ambraciots.

 They also sent for Demosthenes, who had commanded the Athenian expedition against Aetolia, to be their leader; and for the twenty Athenian ships that happened to be cruising about the Peloponnese, under the command of Aristoteles son of Timocrates, and Hierophon son of Antimnestus.

 The Ambraciots at Olpae also sent a messenger to their city, desiring them to come in full force to their assistance, fearing that the troops under Eurylochus might not be able to effect a passage through the Acarnanians, and that they themselves might either have to fight unsupported, or, if they wished to retreat, find it unsafe to do so. The Peloponnesians with Eurylochus, therefore, finding that the Ambraciots at Olpae were come, set out from Proschium and went as quickly as possible to their aid; and having crossed the Acheloüs, proceeded through Acarnania, which was left deserted in consequence of the reinforcement sent to Argos; keeping on their right hand the city of the Stratians with their garrison, and on the left the rest of Acarnania.

 After passing the territory of the Stratians, they proceeded through Phytia, and again through Medeon, along the borders; then through Limnaea; and so they entered the territory of the $Aegraeans, which formed no part of Acarnania, but was friendly to themselves.

 Then, having reached Mount Thyamus, which is uncultivated, they proceeded across it, and so came down into the Argive country by night, and passing unobserved between the city of Argos and the Acarnanian posts at Crenae, joined the Ambraciots at Olpae. Having thus effected a union at day-break, they sat down at the place called Metropolis, and formed their encampment. Not long after, the Athenians came with their twenty ships into the Ambracian Gulf to assist the Argives; and Demosthenes arrived with two hundred heavy-armed of the Messenians, and sixty Athenian archers. The fleet therefore at Olpae blockaded the hill from the sea;

 while the Acarnanians and a few of the Amphilochians (for the majority were forcibly detained by the Ambraciots) had by this time met at Argos, and were preparing to engage with the enemy, having appointed Demosthenes as commander of the whole army in concert with their own generals. He, having led them near to Olpae, encamped there;

 a great ravine separating their armies. For five days they remained still, but on the sixth both sides drew up for battle. And as the force of the Peleponnesians was the larger, and outflanked his, Demosthenes, fearing that he might be surrounded, placed in ambush in a hollow way covered with a thicket, a body of heavy and light-armed troops, four hundred in all, that on the flank of the enemy which reached beyond his own, these troops might rise up in the very midst of the conflict and take them in their rear.

 When the preparations were completed on both sides, they closed in battle. Demosthenes occupied the right wing with the Messenians and the few Athenians; while the remainder of the line was formed by the Acarnanians in their several divisions, and the Amphilochian dartmen that were present. The Peloponnesians and Ambraciots were drawn up without distinction, excepting the Mantineans, who kept together more on the left, though not in the extremity of the flank, for the extreme left was held by Eurylochus and his men, opposed to the Messenians and Demosthenes. When the Peloponnesians, being now engaged, outflanked their opponents, and were surrounding their right, the Acarnanians, rising from the ambuscade, fell on them in the rear, and broke them; so that they did not stand to make any resistance, and, moreover, by their panic threw their main army into flight: for when they saw the division of Eurylochus, and the bravest of their forces being cut to pieces, they were far more alarmed. It was the Messenians, posted in that part of the field with Demosthenes, that performed the chief part of the work.

 But the Ambraciots and those in the right wing defeated the division opposed to them, and pursued it back to Argos; for they are the most warlike of all in those parts.

 When, however, on their return they saw their main army defeated, and the rest of the Acarnanians were pressing them closely, they escaped with difficulty into Olpe; and many of them were killed, while they hurried on without any order, excepting the Mantineans, who kept their ranks best of all the army during the retreat. And so the battle ended, after lasting till evening. The next day Menedaeus, who on the death of Eurylochus and Macarius had succeeded to the sole command, was at a loss, since so great a defeat had been experienced, to see in what way he should either remain and sustain a siege—cut off as he was by land, and at the same time, through the presence of the Athenian fleet, by sea—or should escape if he retreated.

 He therefore made proposals to Demosthenes and the Acarnanians for a truce, and permission to retire, as well as for the recovery of his dead. They restored him his dead, and themselves erected a trophy, and took up their own dead, about three hundred in number; but for permission to retire they did not openly grant any truce to the whole army; but Demosthenes and his Acarnanian colleagues secretly granted one to the Mantineans, and Menedaeus and the other Peloponnesian commanders, to retreat with all speed; wishing to strip of their supporters the Ambraciots and the mercenary host of foreigners; but most of all desiring to raise a prejudice against the Lacedaemonians and Peloponnesians amongst the Greeks in those parts, from the impression of their having betrayed their friends, and deemed their own interest of more importance.

 They, then, took up their dead, and were burying them with all speed, as circumstances allowed; while those who had received permission were planning their retreat. Now tidings were brought to Demosthenes and the Acarnanians, that the Ambraciots at home, in compliance with the first message from Olpae, were marching in full force with succours through Amphilochia, with a wish to join their countrymen at Olpae, and knowing nothing of what had happened.

 Accordingly he straightway sent a division to lay ambushes beforehand in the roads, and to preoccupy the strong positions; while with the rest of his army he prepared to march against them. Meanwhile the Mantineans, and those to whom tile truce had been granted, going out under the pretext of gathering herbs and fire-wood, secretly went away in small parties, picking up at the same time the things for which they professed to have left the camp:

 but when they had now proceeded some distance from Olpae, they began to retreat at a quicker pace. The Ambraciots and the rest, as many as happened thus to have gone out with them in

 ʼἀθρόοι seems to be in opposition to κατ᾽ ὀλίγους in the preceding section. Or it may signify, as Arnold takes it, in such numbers as would justify the experiment, which small parties might think too hazardous. a body, when they found that they were gone away, themselves also pushed forward, and began running, on purpose to overtake them.

 But the Acarnanians at first thought that all alike were flying without permission, and began to pursue the Peloponnesians; and when some even of their generals tried to stop them, and said that permission had been granted to the Peloponnesians, one or two men threw their darts at them, believing that they were being betrayed.

 Afterwards, however, they let the Mantineans and Peloponnesians go away, but killed the Ambraciots. And there was much contention and difficulty in distinguishing whether a man was an Ambraciot or a Peloponnesian. They killed some two hundred of them; the rest escaped into Agraea, a bordering territory, and Salaethus, king of the Agraeans, being their friend, received them. The Ambraciots from the city arrived at Idomene. This town consists of two high hills; the greater of which, after night had come on, the troops sent forward from the camp by Demosthenes preoccupied unobserved; while the Ambraciots had previously ascended the smaller, and bivouaeked on it. Demosthenes, after supper, marched with the rest of the army as soon as it was evening;

 himself with half of his force making for the pass, the remainder proceeding over the mountains of Amphilochia.

 At dawn of day he fell upon the Ambraciots, while they were yet in their beds, and had had no notice of his measures, but much rather imagined that his forces were their own countrymen.

 For Demosthenes had purposely posted the Messenians first, with orders to address them, speaking in the Doric dialect, and so creating confidence in the sentinels; while at the same time they were not visible to the eye, as it was still night.

 When therefore he fell upon them, they routed them, and slew the greater part on the spot; the rest rushed in flight over the mountains.

 But as the roads were preoccupied, and the Amphilochians, moreover, were well acquainted with their own country, and light-armed against a heavy-armed enemy, whereas the Ambraciots were unacquainted with it, and knew not which way to turn, they perished by falling into ravines, and the ambushes that had been previously laid.

 After attempting every mode of escape, some of them also turned to the sea, which was not far off; and when they saw the Athenian ships coasting along shore at the time that the affair happened, they swam to them, in their present alarm thinking it better to be slain, if they must, by those on board, than by their barbarous and most bitter enemies, the Amphilochians.

 The Ambraciots then were destroyed in this manner, and only few of many escaped to their city. The Acarnanians, after stripping the dead, and erecting trophies, returned to Argos. The next day there came to them a herald from the Ambraciots who had fled from Olpae into Agraea, to ask permission to take up the dead whom they had slain after the first engagement, when they left the camp without permission with the Mantineans and those who had received it.

 At sight of the arms taken from the Ambraciots from the city, the herald was astonished at their number; for he was not acquainted with the disaster, but imagined that they had belonged to their own party.

 And some one asked him why he was so astonished; and how many of them had been killed; his interrogator again supposing him to be the herald from the troops at Idomene. He said,

 About two hundred.

 His interrogator, taking him up, said,

 These then are evidently not the arms [of such a number], but of more than a thousand.

 

 The herald said in reply,

 Then they are not the arms of those who fought with us.

 He answered,

 Yes, they are; if at least it was you that fought yesterday at Idomene.

 

 We fought with no one yesterday; but the day before, on our retreat.

 

 Ay, but we fought yesterday with these, who had come as a reinforcement from the city of the Ambraciots.

 

 When the herald heard that, and learned that the reinforcement from the city had been cut off, breaking out into wailing, and astounded at the magnitude of the present evils, he returned without executing his commission, and no longer asked back the bodies.

 For this was the greatest disaster that befell any one Grecian city in an equal number of days during the course of this war: and I have not recorded the numbers of the slain, because the multitude said to have fallen is incredible, in comparison with the size of the city. I know, however, that if the Acarnanians and Amphilochians had wished, in compliance with the advice of Demosthenes, to take Ambracia, they would have done so on the first assault: but as it was, they were afraid that the Athenians, if they had possession of it, might prove more troublesome neighbours to themselves. After this, they allotted a third of the spoils to the Athenians, and divided the rest amongst their several cities. Those given to the Athenians were taken while on their voyage home; and what are now deposited in the temples of Attica, are three hundred full suits of armour, which were reserved for Demosthenes, and with which he sailed back home; his restoration after the disaster in Aetolia being rendered more safe in consequence of this

 achievement. The Athenians on board the twenty ships also returned to Naupactus. The Acarnanians and Amphilochians, on the departure of the Athenians and of Demosthenes, granted a truce to the Ambraciots and Peloponnesians who had taken refuge with Salynthus and the Agraeans, to return from Aeniadae, whither they had removed from the country of

 Salynthus. And to provide for the future, they also concluded a treaty and alliance for a hundred years with the Ambraciots, on these conditions: that neither the Ambraciots should march with the Acarnanians against the Peloponnesians, nor the Acarnanians with the Ambraciots against the Athenians; but that they should succour each other's country; and that the Ambraciots should restore whatever towns or hostages they held from the Amphilochians, and not go to the assistance of Anactorium, which was hostile to the

 Acarnanians. Having made these arrangements, they put an end to the war. Afterwards the Corinthians sent a garrison of their own citizens to Ambracia, consisting of three hundred heavy-armed, under the command of Xenoclides son of Euthycles, who reached their destination by a difficult route through Epirus. Such was the conclusion of the measures in Ambracia.