The king, as is reported, wondered what his purpose might be and commanded him to do as he had said. In this time of respite he learned as much as he could of the language and fashions of the place. And a year after coming to the court, he was great with the king more than ever had been any Grecian before, both for his former dignity and the hope of Greece which he promised to bring into his subjection, but especially for the trial he gave of his wisdom. For Themistocles was a man in whom most truly was manifested the strength of natural judgment, wherein he had something worthy admiration different from other men. For by his natural prudence, without the help of instruction before or after, he was both of extemporary matters upon short deliberation the best discerner and also of what for the most part would be their issue the best conjecturer. What he was perfect in he was able also to explicate, and what he was unpractised in he was not to seek how to judge of conveniently. Also he foresaw, no man better, what was best or worst in any case that was doubtful. And (to say all in few words) this man, by the natural goodness of his wit and quickness of deliberation, was the ablest of all men to tell what was fit to be done upon a sudden. But falling sick he ended his life; some say he died voluntarily by poison because he thought himself unable to perform what he had promised to the king. His monument is in Magnesia in Asia, in the market place; for he had the government of that country, the king having bestowed upon him Magnesia which yielded him fifty talents by the year for his bread, and Lampsacus for his wine (for this city was in those days thought to have store of wine), and the city of Myus for his meat. His bones are said by his kindred to have been brought home by his own appointment and buried in Attica unknown to the Athenians, for it was not lawful to bury one there that had fled for treason. These were the ends of Pausanias the Lacedaemonian and Themistocles the Athenian, the most famous men of all the Grecians of their time. And this is that which the Lacedaemonians did command, and were commanded, in their first embassage touching the banishment of such as were under the curse. After this they sent ambassadors again to Athens commanding them to levy the siege from before Potidaea and to suffer Aegina to be free, but principally and most plainly telling them that the war should not be made in case they would abrogate the act concerning the Megareans, by which act they were forbidden both the fairs of Attica and all ports within the Athenian dominion. But the Athenians would not obey them, neither in the rest of their commands nor in the abrogation of that act, but recriminated the Megareans for having tilled holy ground and unset out with bounds and for receiving of their slaves that revolted. But at length, when the last ambassadors from Lacedaemon were arrived, namely, Ramphias, Melesippus, and Agesander, and spake nothing of that which formerly they were wont but only this, that 
 the Lacedaemonians desire that there should be peace, which may be had if you will suffer the Grecians to be governed by their own laws, the Athenians called an assembly and, propounding their opinions amongst themselves, thought good, after they had debated the matter, to give them an answer once for all. And many stood forth and delivered their minds on either side, some for the war and some that this act concerning the Megareans ought not to stand in their way to peace but to be abrogated. And Pericles the son of 139antippus, the principal man at that time of all Athens and most sufficient both for speech and action, gave his advice in such manner as followeth: "Men of Athens, I am still not only of the same opinion not to give way to the Peloponnesians (notwithstanding I know that men have not the same passions in the war itself which they have when they are incited to it but change their opinions with the events), but also I see that I must now advise the same things or very near to what I have before delivered. And I require of you with whom my counsel shall take place that if we miscarry in aught, you will either make the best of it, as decreed by common consent, or if we prosper, not to attribute it to your own wisdom only. For it falleth out with the events of actions, no less than with the purposes of man, to proceed with uncertainty, which is also the cause that when anything happeneth contrary to our expectation, we use to lay the fault on fortune. That the Lacedaemonians, both formerly and especially now, take counsel how to do us mischief is a thing manifest. For whereas it is said [in the articles] that in our mutual controversies we shall give and receive trials of judgment, and in the meantime either side hold what they possess, they never yet sought any such trial themselves nor will accept of the same offered by us. They will clear themselves of their accusations by war rather than by words, and come hither no more now to expostulate but to command. For they command us to arise from before Potidaea and to restore the Aeginetae to the liberty of their own laws and to abrogate the act concerning the Megareans. And they that come last command us to restore all the Grecians to their liberty. Now let none of you conceive that we shall go to war for a trifle by not abrogating the act concerning Megara (yet this by them is pretended most, and that for the abrogation of it war shall stay), nor retain a scruple in your minds as if a small matter moved you to the war. For even this small matter containeth the trial and constancy of your resolution. Wherein if you give them way, you shall hereafter be commanded a greater matter as men that for fear will obey them likewise in that. But by a stiff denial you shall teach them plainly to come to you hereafter on terms of more equality. "Resolve therefore from this occasion either to yield them obedience before you receive damage, or if we must have war (which for my part I think is best), be the pretence weighty or light, not to give way nor keep what we possess in fear. For a great and a little claim imposed by equals upon their neighbours before judgment by way of command hath one and the same virtue, to make subject. As for the war, how both we and they be furnished, and why we are not like to have the worse, by hearing the particulars you shall now understand. The Peloponnesians are men that live by their labour without money either in particular or in common stock. Besides, in long wars and by sea they are without experience, for that the wars which they have had one against another have been but short through poverty. And such men can neither man their fleets nor yet send out their armies by land very often, because they must be far from their own wealth and yet by that be maintained and be besides barred the use of the sea. It must be a stock of money, not forced contributions, that support the wars; and such as live by their labour are more ready to serve the wars with their bodies than with their money. For they make account that their bodies will outlive the danger, but their money they think is sure to be spent, especially if the war (as it is likely) should last. So that the Peloponnesians and their confederates, though for one battle they be able to stand out against all Greece besides, yet to maintain a war against such as have their preparations of another kind, they are not able; inasmuch as not having one and the same counsel, they can speedily perform nothing upon the occasion; and having equality of vote and being of several races, everyone will press his particular interest, whereby nothing is like to be fully executed. For some will desire to take revenge on some enemy and others to have their estates least wasted. And being long before they can assemble, they take the lesser part of their time to debate the common business and the greater to dispatch their own private affairs. And everyone supposeth that his own neglect of the common estate can do little hurt and that it will be the care of somebody else to look to that for his own good, not observing how by these thoughts of everyone in several the common business is jointly ruined. "But their greatest hindrance of all will be their want of money, which being raised slowly, their actions must be full of delay, which the occasions of war will not endure. As for their fortifying here and their navy, they are matters not worthy fear. For it were a hard matter for a city equal to our own in time of peace to fortify in that manner, much less in the country of an enemy, and we no less fortified against them. And if they had a garrison here, though they might, by excursions and by the receiving of our fugitives, annoy some part of our territory, yet would not that be enough both to besiege us and also to hinder us from sallying into their territories and from taking revenge with our fleet, which is the thing wherein our strength lies. For we have more experience in land service by use of the sea than they have in sea service by use of the land. Nor shall they attain the knowledge of naval affairs easily. For yourselves, though falling to it immediately upon the Persian war, yet have not attained it fully. How then should husbandmen not seamen, whom also we will not suffer to apply themselves to it by lying continually upon them with so great fleets, perform any matter of value? Indeed, if they should be opposed but with a few ships, they might adventure, encouraging their want of knowledge with store of men; but awed by many they will not stir that way, and not applying themselves to it will be yet more unskillful and thereby more cowardly. For knowledge of naval matters is an art as well as any other and not to be attended at idle times and on the by, but requiring rather that while it is a-learning, nothing else should be done on the by. "But say they should take the money at Olympia and Delphi and therewith, at greater wages, go about to draw from us the strangers employed in our fleet, this indeed, if, going aboard both ourselves and those that dwell among us, we could not match them, were a dangerous matter. But now we can both do this and (which is the principal thing) we have steersmen and other necessary men for the service of a ship both more and better of our own citizens than are in all the rest of Greece. Besides that, not any of these strangers upon trial would be found content to fly his own country and, withal upon less hope of victory, for a few days' increase of wages take part with the other side. "In this manner, or like to this, seems to me to stand the case of the Peloponnesians; whereas ours is both free from what in theirs I have reprehended, and has many great advantages besides. If they invade our territory by land, we shall invade theirs by sea. And when we have wasted part of Peloponnesus and they all Attica, yet shall theirs be the greater loss. For they, unless by the sword, can get no other territory instead of that we shall destroy; whereas for us there is other land both in the islands and continent. For the dominion of the sea is a great matter. Consider but this. If we dwelt in the islands, whether of us then were more inexpugnable? We must therefore now, drawing as near as can be to that imagination, lay aside the care of fields and villages, and not for the loss of them, out of passion, give battle to the Peloponnesians, far more in number than ourselves. For though we give them an overthrow, we must fight again with as many more; and if we be overthrown, we shall lose the help of our confederates, which are our strength; for when we cannot war upon them, they will revolt. Nor bewail ye the loss of fields or houses but of men's bodies; for men may acquire these, but these cannot acquire men. And if I thought I should prevail, I would advise you to go out and destroy them yourselves and show the Peloponnesians that you will never the sooner obey them for such things as these. There be many other things that give hope of victory in case you do not, whilst you are in this war, strive to enlarge your dominion and undergo other voluntary dangers (for I am afraid of our own errors more than of their designs); but they shall be spoken of at another time in prosecution of the war itself. For the present, let us send away these men with this answer: 'that the Megareans shall have the liberty of our fairs and ports if the Lacedaemonians will also make no banishment of us nor of our confederates as of strangers,' for neither our act concerning Megara nor their banishment of strangers is forbidden in the articles, 'also, that we will let the Grecian cities be free if they were so when the peace was made; and if the Lacedaemonians will also give leave unto their confederates to use their freedom not as shall serve the turn of the Lacedaemonians, but as they themselves shall every one think good; also that we will stand to judgment according to the articles and will not begin the war but be revenged on those that shall.' For this is both just and for the dignity of the city to answer. Nevertheless you must know that of necessity war there will be; and the more willingly we embrace it, the less pressing we shall have our enemies, and that out of the greatest dangers, whether to cities or private men, arise the greatest honours. For our fathers, when they undertook the Medes, did from less beginnings, nay abandoning the little they had, by wisdom rather than fortune, by courage rather than strength, both repel the barbarian and advance this state to the height it now is at. Of whom we ought not now to come short but rather to revenge us by all means upon our enemies, and do our best to deliver the state unimpaired by us to posterity. Thus spake Pericles. The Athenians, liking best of his advice, decreed as he would have them, answering the Lacedaemonians according to his direction, both in particulars as he had spoken and generally, 
 that they would do nothing on command, but were ready to answer their accusations upon equal terms by way of arbitrament. So the ambassadors went home, and after these there came no more. These were the quarrels and differences on either side before the war, which quarrels began presently upon the business of Epidamnus and Corcyra. Nevertheless there was still commerce betwixt them, and they went to each other without any herald, though not without jealousy. For the things that had passed were but the confusion of the articles and matter of the war to follow. THE SECOND BOOK THE PRINCIPAL CONTENTS The entry of the Theban soldiers into Plataea by the treason of some within. Their repulse and slaughter. The irruption of the Peloponnesians into Attica. The wasting of the coast of Peloponnesus by the Athenian fleet. The public funeral of the first slain. The second invasion of Attica. The pestilence in the city of Athens. The Ambraciotes' war against the Amphilochi. Plataea assaulted, besieged. The Peloponnesian fleet beaten by Phormio before the strait of the Gulf of Crissa. The same fleet repaired and reinforced, and beaten again by Phormio before Naupactus. The attempt of the Peloponnesians on Salamis. The fruitless expedition of the Thracians against the Macedonians. This in the first three years of the war. The war between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians beginneth now from the time they had no longer commerce one with another without a herald, and that having once begun it they warred without intermission. And it is written in order by summers and winters according as from time to time the several matters came to pass. The peace, which after the winning of Euboea was concluded for thirty years, lasted fourteen years. But in the fifteenth year, being the forty-eighth of the priesthood of Chrysis in Argos, Aenesias being then ephor at Sparta and Pythadorus, archon of Athens, having then two months of his government to come, in the sixth month after the battle at Potidaea and in the beginning of the spring, three hundred and odd Thebans led by Pythangelus the son of Phyleides and Diemporus the son of Onetoridas, Boeotian rulers, about the first watch of the night entered with their arms into Plataea, a city of Boeotia and confederate of the Athenians. They were brought in and the gates opened unto them by Naucleides and his accomplices, men of Plataea that for their own private ambition intended both the destruction of such citizens as were their enemies and the putting of the whole city under the subjection of the Thebans. This they negotiated with one Eurymachus the son of Leontiadas, one of the most potent men of Thebes. For the Thebans, foreseeing the war, desired to preoccupy Plataea, which was always at variance with them, whilst there was yet peace and the war not openly on foot. By which means they more easily entered undiscovered, there being no order taken before for a watch. And making a stand in their arms in the market place, they did not, as they that gave them entrance would have had them, fall presently to the business and enter the houses of their adversaries, but resolved rather to make favourable proclamation and to induce the city to composition and friendship. And the herald proclaimed, 
 that if any man, according to the ancient custom of all the Boeotians, would enter into the same league of war with them, he should come and bring his arms to theirs, supposing the city by this means would easily be drawn to their side. The Plataeans, when they perceived that the Thebans were already entered and had surprised the city, through fear and opinion that more were entered than indeed were (for they could not see them in the night), came to composition and accepting the condition rested quiet, and the rather, for that they had yet done no man harm. But whilst that these things were treating, they observed that the Thebans were not many and thought that if they should set upon them, they might easily have the victory. For the Plataean commons were not willing to have revolted from the Athenians. Wherefore it was thought fit to undertake the matter, and they united themselves by digging through the common walls between house and house that they might not be discovered as they passed the streets. They also placed carts in the streets without the cattle that drew them to serve them instead of a wall, and every other thing they put in readiness as they severally seemed necessary for the present enterprise. When all things according to their means were ready, they marched from their houses towards the enemies, taking their time whilst it was yet night and a little before the break of day because they would not have to charge them when they should be emboldened by the light and on equal terms, but when they should by night be terrified and inferior to them in knowledge of the places of the city. So they forthwith set upon them and came quickly up to hand strokes. And the Thebans, seeing this and finding they were deceived, cast themselves into a round figure and beat them back in that part where the assault was made; and twice or thrice they repulsed them. But at last, when both the Plataeans themselves charged them with a great clamour, and their wives also and families shouted and screeched from the houses and withal threw stones and tiles amongst them, the night having been also very wet, they were afraid and turned their backs and fled here and there about the city, ignorant for the most part, in the dark and dirt, of the ways out by which they should have been saved (for this accident fell out upon the change of the moon) and pursued by such as were well acquainted with the ways to keep them in; insomuch as the greatest part of them perished. The gate by which they entered, and which only was left open, a certain Plataean shut up again with the head of a javelin, which he thrust into the staple instead of a bolt, so that this way also their passage was stopped. As they were chased up and down the city, some climbed the walls and cast themselves out and for the most part died. Some came to a deserted gate of the city and with a hatchet given them by a woman cut the staple and got forth unseen; but these were not many, for the thing was soon discovered. Others again were slain dispersed in several parts of the city. But the greatest part, and those especially who had cast themselves before into a ring, happened into a great edifice adjoining to the wall, the doors whereof, being open, they thought had been the gates of the city and that there had been a direct way through to the other side. The Plataeans, seeing them now pent up, consulted whether they should burn them as they were by firing the house or else resolve of some other punishment. At length both these and all the rest of the Thebans that were straggling in the city agreed to yield themselves and their arms to the Plataeans at discretion. And this success had they that entered into Plataea. But the rest of the Thebans that should with their whole power have been there before day for fear the surprise should not succeed with those that were in, came so late with their aid that they heard the news of what was done by the way. Now Plataea is from Thebes seventy furlongs, and they marched the slower for the rain which had fallen the same night. For the river Asopus was swollen so high that it was not easily passable. So that what by the foulness of the way and what by the difficulty of passing the river, they arrived not till their men were already some slain and some taken prisoners. When the Thebans understood how things had gone, they lay in wait for such of the Plataeans as were without (for there were abroad in the villages both men and household stuff, as was not unlikely, the evil happening unexpectedly and in time of peace), desiring, if they could take any prisoners, to keep them for exchange for those of theirs within, which (if any were so) were saved alive. This was the Thebans' purpose. But the Plataeans, whilst they were yet in council, suspecting that some such thing would be done and fearing their case without, sent a herald unto the Thebans whom they commanded to say that what they had already done, attempting to surprise their city in time of peace, was done wickedly, and to forbid them to do any injury to those without, and that otherwise they would kill all those men of theirs that they had alive, which, if they would withdraw their forces out of their territory, they would again restore unto them. Thus the Thebans say, and that the Plataeans did swear it. But the Plataeans confess not that they promised to deliver them presently but upon treaty if they should agree, and deny that they swore it. Upon this the Thebans went out of their territory; and the Plataeans, when they had speedily taken in whatsoever they had in the country, immediately slew their prisoners. They that were taken were one hundred and eighty; and Eurymachus, with whom the traitors had practised, was one. When they had done, they sent a messenger to Athens and gave truce to the Thebans to fetch away the bodies of their dead, and ordered the city as was thought convenient for the present occasion. The news of what was done coming straightway to Athens, they instantly laid hands on all the Boeotians then in Attica and sent an officer to Plataea to forbid their farther proceeding with their Theban prisoners till such time as they also should have advised of the matter; for they were not yet advertised of their putting to death. For the first messenger was sent away when the Thebans first entered the town; and the second, when they were overcome and taken prisoners; but of what followed after they knew nothing. So that the Athenians, when they sent, knew not what was done; and the officer arriving found that the men were already slain. After this, the Athenians sending an army to Plataea, victualled it and left a garrison in it, and took thence both the women and children and also such men as were unserviceable for the war. This action falling out at Plataea and the peace now clearly dissolved, the Athenians prepared themselves for war; so also did the Lacedaemonians and their confederates, intending on either part to send ambassadors to the king and to other barbarians, wheresoever they had hope of succours, and contracting leagues with such cities as were not under their own command. The Lacedaemonians besides those galleys which they had in Italy and Sicily, of the cities that took part with them there, were ordered to furnish, proportionably to the greatness of their several cities, so many more as the whole number might amount to five hundred sail and to provide a sum of money assessed, and in other things not to stir farther but to receive the Athenians coming but with one galley at once till such time as the same should be ready. The Athenians, on the other side, surveyed their present confederates and sent ambassadors to those places that lay about Peloponnesus, as Corcyra, Cephalonia, Acarnania, and Zacynthus, knowing that as long as these were their friends, they might with the more security make war round about upon the coast of Peloponnesus. Neither side conceived small matters but put their whole strength to the war, and not without reason. For all men in the beginnings of enterprises are the most eager. Besides, there were then in Peloponnesus many young men, and many in Athens, who for want of experience not unwillingly undertook the war. And not only the rest of Greece stood at gaze to behold the two principal states in combat, but many prophecies were told and many sung by the priests of the oracles both in the cities about to war and in others. There was also a little before this an earthquake in Delos, which in the memory of the Grecians never shook before, and was interpreted for and seemed to be a sign of what was to come afterwards to pass. And whatsoever thing then chanced of the same nature, it was all sure to be inquired after. But men's affections for the most part went with the Lacedaemonians, and the rather, for that they gave out they would recover the Grecians' liberty. And every man, both private and public person, endeavoured as much as in them lay both in word and deed to assist them and thought the business so much hindered as himself was not present at it. In such passion were most men against the Athenians, some for desire to be delivered from under their government and others for fear of falling into it. And these were the preparations and affections brought unto the war. But the confederates of either party, which they had when they began it, were these. The Lacedaemonians had all Peloponnesus within the isthmus except the Argives and Achaeans (for these were in amity with both, save that the Pellenians at first, only of all Achaia, took their part; but afterwards all the rest did so likewise); and without Peloponnesus, the Megareans, Locrians, Boeotians, Phoceans, Ambraciotes, Leucadians, and Anactorians. Of which the Corinthians, Megareans, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleians, Ambraciotes, and Leucadians found shipping; the Boeotians, Phoceans, and Locrians, horsemen; and the rest of the cities, footmen. And these were the confederates of the Lacedaemonians. The Athenian confederates were these: the Chians, Lesbians, Plataeans, the Messenians in Naupactus, most of the Acarnanians, Corcyraeans, Zacynthians, and other cities their tributaries among those nations; also that part of Caria which is on the seacoast and the Dorians adjoining to them; Ionia, Hellespont, the cities bordering on Thrace; all the islands from Peloponnesus to Crete on the east and all the rest of the Cyclades except Melos and Thera. Of these the Chians, Lesbians, and Corcyraeans found galleys; the rest, footmen and money. These were their confederates and the preparation for the war on both sides. The Lacedaemonians, after the business of Plataea, sent messengers presently up and down Peloponnesus and to their confederates without to have in readiness their forces and such things as should be necessary for a foreign expedition, as intending the invasion of Attica. And when they were all ready, they came to the rendezvous in the isthmus at a day appointed, two-thirds of the forces of every city. When the whole army was gotten together, Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, general of the expedition, called together the commanders of the several cities and such as were in authority and most worthy to be present and spake unto them as followeth: Men of Peloponnesus and confederates, not only our fathers have had many wars, both within and without Peloponnesus, but we ourselves also, such as are anything in years, have been sufficiently acquainted therewith; yet did we never before set forth with so great a preparation as at this present. And now, not only we are a numerous and puissant army that invade, but the state also is puissant that is invaded by us. We have reason therefore to show ourselves neither worse than our fathers nor short of the opinion conceived of ourselves. For all Greece is up at this commotion observing us, and through their hatred to the Athenians do wish that we may accomplish whatsoever we intend. And therefore, though we seem to invade them with a great army and to have much assurance that they will not come out against us to battle, yet we ought not for this to march the less carefully prepared but of every city, as well the captain as the soldier, to expect always some danger or other in that part wherein he himself is placed. For the accidents of war are uncertain, and for the most part the onset begins from the lesser number and upon passion. And oftentimes the lesser number, being afraid, hath beaten back the greater with the more ease; for that through contempt they have gone unprepared. And in the land of an enemy, though the soldiers ought always to have bold hearts yet for action, they ought to make their preparations as if they were afraid. For that will give them both more courage to go upon the enemy and more safety in fighting with him. But we invade not now a city that cannot defend itself but a city every way well appointed. So that we must by all means expect to be fought withal, though not now because we be not yet there, yet hereafter, when they shall see us in their country wasting and destroying their possessions. For all men, when in their own sight and on a sudden they receive any extraordinary hurt, fall presently into choler; and the less they consider, with the more stomach they assault. And this is likely to hold in the Athenians somewhat more than in the others, for they think themselves worthy to have the command of others and to invade and waste the territories of their neighbours rather than to see their neighbours waste theirs. Wherefore, as being to war against a great city and to procure both to your ancestors and yourselves a great fame, either good or bad as shall be the event, follow your leaders in such sort as above all things you esteem of order and watchfulness. For there is nothing in the world more comely nor more safe than when many men are seen to observe one and the same order. Archidamus, having thus spoken and dismissed the council, first sent Melesippus the son of Diacritus, a man of Sparta, to Athens to try if the Athenians, seeing them now on their journey, would yet in some degree remit of their obstinacy. But the Athenians neither received him into their city nor presented him to the state; for the opinion of Pericles had already taken place, not to receive from the Lacedaemonians neither herald nor ambassador as long as their army was abroad. Therefore they sent him back without audience with commandment to be out of their borders the selfsame day, and that hereafter if they would anything with them, they should return everyone to his home and send their ambassadors from thence. They sent with him also certain persons to convoy him out of the country to the end that no man should confer with him, who, when he came to the limits and was to be dismissed, uttered these words, 
 This day is the beginning of much evil unto the Grecians, and so departed. When he returned to the camp, Archidamus, perceiving that they would not relent, dislodged and marched on with his army into their territory. The Boeotians with their appointed part and with horsemen aided the Peloponnesians, but with the rest of their forces went and wasted the territory of Plataea. Whilst the Peloponnesians were coming together in the isthmus, and when they were on their march before they brake into Attica, Pericles the son of 13antippus, who with nine others was general of the Athenians, when he saw they were about to break in, suspecting that Archidamus, either of private courtesy or by command of the Lacedaemonians to bring him into jealousy (as they had before for his sake commanded the excommunication), might oftentimes leave his lands untouched, told the Athenians beforehand in an assembly, 
 that though Archidamus had been his guest, it was for no ill to the state; and howsoever, if the enemy did not waste his lands and houses as well as the rest, that then he gave them to the commonwealth, and therefore desired 
 that for this he might not be suspected. Also he advised them concerning the business in hand the same things he had done before, 
 that they should make preparations for the war and receive their goods into the city; that they should not go out to battle but come into the city and guard it; that they should also furnish out their navy, wherein consisted their power, and hold a careful hand over their confederates, telling them, 
 how that in the money that came from these lay their strength, and that the victory in war consisted wholly in counsel and store of money. Farther he bade them be confident, 
 in that there was yearly coming into the state from the confederates for tribute, besides other revenue, six hundred talents, and remaining yet then in the citadel six thousand talents of silver coin, (for the greatest sum there had been was ten thousand talents wanting three hundred, out of which was taken that which had been expended upon the gate-houses of the citadel and upon other buildings and for the charges of Potidaea) besides the uncoined gold and silver of private and public offerings, and all the dedicated vessels belonging to the shows and games, and the spoils of the Persian, and other things of that nature, which amounted to no less than five hundred talents. He added farther that 
 much money might be had out of other temples without the city which they might use; and if they were barred the use of all these, they might yet use the ornaments of gold about the goddess herself ; and said that 
 the image had about it the weight of forty talents of most pure gold and which might all be taken off; but having made use of it for their safety, he said, 
 they were to make restitution of the like quantity again. Thus he encouraged them touching matter of money. Men of arms, he said, 
 they had thirteen thousand besides the sixteen thousand that were employed for the guard of the city and upon the walls. For so many at the first kept watch at the coming in of the enemy, young and old together and strangers that dwelt amongst them as many as could bear arms. For the length of the Phalerian wall to that part of the circumference of the wall of the city where it joined was thirtyfive furlongs, and that part of the circumference which was guarded (for some of it was not kept with a watch, namely, the part between the long wall and the Phalerian) was forty-three furlongs. And the length of the long walls down to Piraeus (of which there was a watch only on the outmost) was forty furlongs. And the whole compass of Piraeus together with Munychia was sixty furlongs, whereof that part that was watched was but half. He said farther, 
 they had of horsemen, accounting archers on horseback, twelve hundred; and sixteen hundred archers; and of galleys fit for the sea, three hundred. All this and no less had the Athenians when the invasion of the Peloponnesians was first in hand and when the war began. These and other words spake Pericles, as he used to do, for demonstration that they were likely to outlast this war. When the Athenians had heard him, they approved of his words and fetched into the city their wives and children and the furniture of their houses, pulling down the very timber of the houses themselves. Their sheep and oxen they sent over into Euboea and into the islands over against them. Nevertheless this removal, in respect they had most of them been accustomed to the country life, grieved them very much. This custom was from great antiquity more familiar with the Athenians than any other of the rest of Greece. For in the time of Cecrops and the first kings down to Theseus the inhabitants of Attica had their several boroughs and therein their common halls and their governors, and, unless they were in fear of some danger, went not to the king for advice; but every city administered their own affairs and deliberated by themselves. And some of them had also their particular wars, as the Eleusinians who joined with Eumolpus against Erectheus. But after Theseus came to the kingdom, one who besides his wisdom was also a man of very great power, he not only set good order in the country in other respects but also dissolved the councils and magistracies of the rest of the towns; and assigning them all one hall and one council-house, brought them all to cohabit in the city that now is; and constrained them, enjoying their own as before, to use this one for their city, which (now when they all paid their duties to it) grew great and was by Theseus so delivered to posterity. And from that time to this day, the Athenians keep a holiday at the public charge to the goddess and call it Synoecia. That which is now the citadel, and the part which is to the south of the citadel, was before this time the city. An argument whereof is this: that the temples of the gods are all set either in the citadel itself or, if without, yet in that quarter, as that of Jupiter Olympius and of Apollo Pythius and of Tellus and of Bacchus in Limnae (in honour of whom the old Bacchanals were celebrated on the twelfth day of the month Athesterion, according as the Ionians who are derived from Athens do still observe them), besides other ancient temples situated in the same part. Moreover, they served themselves with water for the best uses of the fountain which, now the Nine-pipes, built so by the tyrants, was formerly, when the springs were open, called Callirhoe, and was near. And from the old custom, before marriages and other holy rites they ordain the use of the same water to this day. And the citadel, from the ancient habitation of it, is also by the Athenians still called the city. The Athenians therefore had lived a long time governed by laws of their own country towns and, after they were brought into one, were nevertheless (both for the custom which most had, as well of the ancient time as since till the Persian war, to live in the country with their whole families; and also especially for that since the Persian war they had already repaired their houses and furniture) unwilling to remove. It pressed them likewise and was heavily taken besides their houses to leave the things that pertained to their religion (which, since their old form of government, were become patrial) and to change their manner of life and to be no better than banished every man his city. After they came into Athens, there was habitation for a few and place of retire with some friends or kindred. But the greatest part seated themselves in the empty places of the city and in temples and in all the chapels of the heroes, saving in such as were in the citadel and the Eleusinium and other places strongly shut up. The Pelasgicum also under the citadel, though it were a thing accursed to dwell in it and forbidden by the end of a verse in a Pythian oracle in these words, 
 Best is the Pelasgicum empty, was nevertheless for the present necessity inhabited. And in my opinion, this prophecy now fell out contrary to what was looked for. For the unlawful dwelling there caused not the calamities that befell the city, but the war caused the necessity of dwelling there, which war the oracle, not naming, foretold only that it should one day be inhabited unfortunately. Many also furnished the turrets of the walls and whatsoever other place they could any of them get. For when they were come in, the city had not place for them all; but afterwards they had the long walls divided amongst them and inhabited there and in most parts of Piraeus. Withal they applied themselves to the business of the war, levying their confederates and making ready a hundred galleys to send about Peloponnesus. Thus were the Athenians preparing. The army of the Peloponnesians marching forward came first to Oenoe, a town of Attica, the place where they intended to break in, and encamping before it, prepared with engines and by other means to assault the wall. For Oenoe, lying on the confines between Attica and Boeotia, was walled about; and the Athenians kept a garrison in it for defence of the country when at any time there should be war. For which cause they made preparation for the assault of it, and also spent much time about it otherwise. And Archidamus for this was not a little taxed as thought to have been both slow in gathering together the forces for the war and also to have favoured the Athenians in that he encouraged not the army to a forwardness in it. And afterwards likewise his stay in the isthmus and his slowness in the whole journey was laid to his charge, but especially his delay at Oenoe. For in this time the Athenians retired into the city: whereas it was thought that the Peloponnesians, marching speedily, might but for this delay have taken them all without. So passionate was the army of Archidamus for his stay before Oenoe. But expecting that the Athenians, whilst their territory was yet unhurt, would relent and not endure to see it wasted, for that cause (as it is reported) he held his hand. But after, when they had assaulted Oenoe and tried all means but could not take it, and seeing the Athenians sent no herald to them, then at length arising from thence—about eighty days after that which happened to the Thebans that entered Plataea, the summer and corn being now at the highest—they fell into Attica, led by Archidamus the son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. And when they had pitched their camp, they fell to wasting of the country, first about Eleusis and then in the plain of Thriasia, and put to flight a few Athenian horsemen at the brooks called Rheiti. After this, leaving the Aegaleon on the right hand, they passed through Cecropia till they came unto Acharnas, which is the greatest town in all Attica of those that are called Demoi, and pitching there, both fortified their camp and stayed a great while wasting the country thereabout. Archidamus was said to have stayed so long at Acharnas with his army in battle array and not to have come down all the time of his invasion into the champaign with this intention. He hoped that the Athenians, flourishing in number of young men and better furnished for war than ever they were before, would perhaps have come forth against him and not endured to see their fields cut down and wasted; and, therefore, seeing they met him not in Thriasia, he thought good to try if they would come out against him lying now at Acharnas. Besides, the place seemed unto him commodious for the army to lie in; and it was thought also that the Acharnans, being a great piece of the city (for they were three thousand men of arms), would not have suffered the spoiling of their lands, but rather have urged the rest to go out and fight. And if they came not out against him at this invasion, they might hereafter more boldly both waste the champaign country and come down even to the walls of the city. For the Acharnans, after they should have lost their own, would not be so forward to hazard themselves for the goods of other men; but there would be the thoughts of sedition in one towards another in the city. These were the cogitations of Archidamus, whilst he lay at Acharnas. The Athenians, as long as the army of the enemy lay about Eleusis and the fields of Thrius and as long as they had any hope it would come on no farther, remembering that also Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias, king of Lacedaemon, when fourteen years before this war he entered Attica with an army of the Peloponnesians as far as Eleusis and Thriasia, retired again and came no farther (for which he was also banished Sparta as thought to have gone back for money), they stirred not. But when they saw the army now at Acharnas but sixty furlongs from the city, then they thought it no longer to be endured; and when their fields were wasted (as it was likely) in their sight, which the younger sort had never seen before nor the elder but in the Persian war, it was taken for a horrible matter and thought fit by all, especially by the youth, to go out and not endure it any longer. And holding councils apart one from another, they were at much contention, some to make a sally and some to hinder it. And the priests of the oracles giving out prophecies of all kinds, everyone made the interpretation according to the sway of his own affection. But the Acharnians, conceiving themselves to be no small part of the Athenians, were they that, whilst their own lands were wasting, most of all urged their going out. Insomuch as the city was every way in tumult and in choler against Pericles, remembering nothing of what he had formerly admonished them, but reviled him for that being their general he refused to lead them into the field, and imputing unto him the cause of all their evil. But Pericles, seeing them in passion for their present loss and ill advised and being confident he was in the right touching not sallying, assembled them not nor called any council for fear lest being together they might upon passion rather than judgment commit some error, but looked to the guarding of the city and as much as he could to keep it in quiet. Nevertheless he continually sent out horsemen to keep the scouts of the army from entering upon and doing hurt to the fields near the city. And there happened at Phrygii a small skirmish between one troop of horse of the Athenians, with whom were also the Thessalians, and the horsemen of the Boeotians. Wherein the Athenians and Thessalians had not the worse till such time as the Boeotians were aided by the coming in of their men of arms; and then they were put to flight and a few of the Athenians and Thessalians slain, whose bodies, notwithstanding, they fetched off the same day without leave of the enemy. And the Peloponnesians the next day erected a trophy. This aid of the Thessalians was upon an ancient league with the Athenians and consisted of Larissaeans, Pharsalians, Parasians, Cranonians, Pyrasians, Gyrtonians, Pheraeans. The leaders of the Larissaeans were Polymedes and Aristonus, men of contrary factions in their city; of the Pharsalians, Meno; and of the rest, out of the several cities several commanders. The Peloponnesians, seeing the Athenians would not come out to fight, dislodging from Acharnas wasted certain other villages between the hills Parnethus and Brelissus. Whilst these were in Attica, the Athenians sent the hundred galleys which they had provided, and in them one thousand men of arms and four hundred archers, about Peloponnesus, the commanders whereof were Charcinus the son of 23enotimus, Proteus the son of Epicles, and Socrates the son of Antigenes, who thus furnished weighed anchor and went their way. The Peloponnesians, when they had stayed in Attica as long as their provision lasted, went home through Boeotia, not the way they came in, but passing by Oropus, wasted the country called Peiraice, which is of the tillage of the Oropians, subjects to the people of Athens. And when they were come back into Peloponnesus, they disbanded and went every man to his own city. When they were gone, the Athenians ordained watches both by sea and land, such as were to continue to the end of the war, and made a decree to take out a thousand talents of the money in the citadel and set it by so as it might not be spent, but the charges of the war be borne out of other money, and made it capital for any man to move or give his vote for the stirring of this money for any other use, but only if the enemy should come with an army by sea to invade the city for necessity of that defence. Together with this money they likewise set apart one hundred galleys, and those to be every year the best and captains to be appointed over them, which were to be employed for no other use than the money was and for the same danger if need should require. The Athenians that were with the hundred galleys about Peloponnesus and with them the Corcyraeans with the aid of fifty sail more and certain others of the confederates thereabout amongst other places which they infested in their course landed at Methone, a town of Laconia, and assaulted it as being but weak and few men within. But it chanced that Brasidas the son of Tellis, a Spartan, had a garrison in those parts, and hearing of it, succoured those of the town with one hundred men of arms. Wherewith running through the Athenian army, dispersed in the fields, directly towards the town, he put himself into Methone; and with the loss of few of his men in the passage he saved the place, and for this adventure was the first that was praised at Sparta in this war. The Athenians putting off from thence sailed along the coast and put in at Pheia of Elis, where they spent two days in wasting the country and in a skirmish overthrew three hundred choice men of the Lower Elis together with other Eleians thereabouts that came forth to defend it. But the wind arising and their galleys being tossed by the weather in a harbourless place, the most of them embarked and sailed about the promontory called Icthys into the haven of Pheia. But the Messenians and certain others that could not get aboard went by land to the town of Pheia and rifled it. And when they had done, the galleys that now were come about took them in and, leaving Pheia, put forth to sea again. By which time a great army of Eleians was come to succour it, but the Athenians were now gone away and wasting some other territory. About the same time the Athenians sent likewise thirty galleys about Locris, which were to serve also for a watch about Euboea. Of these Cleopompus the son of Clinias had the conduct and, landing his soldiers in divers parts, both wasted some places of the sea coast and won the town of Thronium, of which he took hostages, and overcame in fight at Alope the Locrians that came out to aid it. The same summer, the Athenians put the Aeginetae, man, woman, and child, out of Aegina, laying to their charge that they were the principal cause of the present war. And it was also thought the safer course to hold Aegina, being adjacent to Peloponnesus, with a colony of their own people; and not long after they sent inhabitants into the same. When the Aeginetae were thus banished, the Lacedaemonians gave them Thyrea to dwell in and the occupation of the lands belonging unto it to live on, both upon hatred to the Athenians, and for the benefits received at the hands of the Aeginetae in the time of the earthquake and insurrection of the Helotes. This territory of Thyrea is in the border between Argolica and Laconica, and reacheth to the seaside. So some of them were placed there, and the rest dispersed into other parts of Greece. Also the same summer, on the first day of the month according to the moon (at which time it seems only possible), in the afternoon happened an eclipse of the sun. The which, after it had appeared in the form of a crescent and withal some stars had been discerned, came afterwards again to the former brightness. The same summer also, the Athenians made Nymphodorus the son of Pythos, of the city of Abdera (whose sister was married to Sitalces and that was of great power with him), their host, though before they took him for an enemy, and sent for him to Athens, hoping by his means to bring Sitalces the son of Teres, king of Thrace, into their league. This Teres, the father of Sitalces, was the first that advanced the kingdom of the Odrysians above the power of the rest of Thrace. For much of Thrace consisteth of free states. And Tereus that took to wife out of Athens Procne the daughter of Pandion was no kin to this Teres nor of the same part of Thrace. But that Tereus was of the city of Daulia in the country now called Phocis, then inhabited by the Thracians. And the fact of the women concerning Itys was done there; and by the poets, where they mention the nightingale, that bird is also called Daulias. And it is more likely that Pandion matched his daughter to this man, for vicinity and mutual succour, than with the other that was so many days' journey off as Odrysae. And Teres (which is also another name) was the first that seized on the kingdom of Odrysae. Now Sitalces, this man's son, the Athenians got into their league that they might have the towns lying on Thrace and Perdiccas to be of their party. Nymphodorus, when he came to Athens, made this league between them and Sitalces and caused Sadocus the son of Sitalces to be made free of Athens and also undertook to end the war in Thrace. For he would persuade Sitalces to send unto the Athenians a Thracian army of horsemen and targeteers. He likewise reconciled Perdiccas to the Athenians, and procured of him the restitution of Therme. And Perdiccas presently aided the Athenians and Phormio in the war against the Chalcideans. Thus were Sitalces the son of Teres, king of Thrace, and Perdiccas the son of Alexander, king of Macedonia, made confederates with the Athenians. The Athenians, being yet with their hundred galleys about Peloponnesus, took Solium, a town that belonged to the Corinthians, and put the Palaerenses only, of all the Acarnanians, into the possession both of the town and territory. Having also by force taken Astacus from the tyrant Euarchus, they drave him thence and joined the place to their league. From thence they sailed to Cephalonia and subdued it without battle (this Cephalonia is an island lying over against Acarnania and Leucas and hath in it these four cities, the Pallenses, Cranii, Samaei, and Pronaei) and not long after returned with their fleet to Athens. About the end of the autumn of this summer the Athenians, both themselves and the strangers that dwelt amongst them, with the whole power of the city, under the conduct of Pericles the son 31antippus, invaded the territory of Megara. And those Athenians likewise that had been with the hundred galleys about Peloponnesus, in their return, being now at Aegina, hearing that the whole power of the city was gone into Megaris, went and joined them. And this was the greatest army that ever the Athenians had together in one place before, the city being now in her strength and the plague not yet amongst them. For the Athenians themselves were no less than ten thousand men of arms, besides the three thousand at Potidaea; and the strangers that dwelt amongst them and accompanied them in this invasion were no fewer than three thousand men of arms more, besides other great numbers of lightarmed soldiers. And when they had wasted the greatest part of the country, they went back to Athens. And afterwards, year after year during this war the Athenians often invaded Megaris, sometimes with their horsemen and sometimes with their whole army, until such time as they had won Nisaea. Also in the end of this summer they fortified Atalante, an island lying upon the Locrians of Opus, desolate till then, for a garrison against thieves, which passing over from Opus and other parts of Locris might annoy Euboea. These were the things done this summer after the retreat of the Peloponnesians out of Attica. The winter following, Euarchus of Acarnania, desirous to return to Astacus, prevaileth with the Corinthians to go thither with forty galleys and fifteen hundred men of arms to re-establish him, to which he hired also certain other mercenaries for the same purpose. The commanders of this army were Euphamidas the son of Aristonymus, Timoxenes the son of Timocrates, and Eumachus the son of Chrysis. When they had re-established him, they endeavoured to draw to their party some other places on the seacoast of Acarnania; but missing their purpose, they set sail homeward. As they passed by the coast of Cephalonia, they disbarked in the territory of the Cranii where, under colour of composition, they were deceived and lost some part of their forces. For the assault made upon them by the Cranii being unexpected, they got off with much ado and went home. The same winter the Athenians, according to their ancient custom, solemnized a public funeral of the first slain in this war in this manner. Having set up a tent, they put into it the bones of the dead three days before the funeral; and everyone bringeth whatsoever he thinks good to his own. When the day comes of carrying them to their burial, certain cypress coffins are carried along in carts, for every tribe one, in which are the bones of the men of every tribe by themselves. There is likewise borne an empty hearse covered over for such as appear not nor were found amongst the rest when they were taken up. The funeral is accompanied by any that will, whether citizen or stranger; and the women of their kindred are also by at the burial lamenting and mourning. Then they put them into a public monument which standeth in the fairest suburbs of the city, in which place they have ever interred all that died in the wars except those that were slain in the field of Marathon, who, because their virtue was thought extraordinary, were therefore buried thereright. And when the earth is thrown over them, someone thought to exceed the rest in wisdom and dignity, chosen by the city, maketh an oration wherein he giveth them such praises as are fit; which done, the company depart. And this is the form of that burial; and for the whole time of the war, whensoever there was occasion, they observed the same. For these first the man chosen to make the oration was Pericles the son of 34antippus, who, when the time served, going out of the place of burial into a high pulpit to be heard the farther off by the multitude about him, spake unto them in this manner: "Though most that have spoken formerly in this place have commended the man that added this oration to the law as honourable for those that die in the wars, yet to me it seemeth sufficient that they who have showed their valour by action should also by an action have their honour, as now you see they have, in this their sepulture performed by the state, and not to have the virtue of many hazarded on one to be believed as that one shall make a good or bad oration. For to speak of men in a just measure, is a hard matter; and though one do so, yet he shall hardly get the truth firmly believed. The favourable hearer and he that knows what was done will perhaps think what is spoken short of what he would have it and what it was; and he that is ignorant will find somewhat on the other side which he will think too much extolled, especially if he hear aught above the pitch of his own nature. For to hear another man praised finds patience so long only as each man shall think he could himself have done somewhat of that he hears. And if one exceed in their praises, the hearer presently through envy thinks it false. But since our ancestors have so thought good, I also, following the same ordinance, must endeavour to be answerable to the desires and opinions of everyone of you as far forth as I can. "I will begin at our ancestors; being a thing both just and honest that to them first be given the honour of remembrance in this kind. For they, having been always the inhabitants of this region, by their valour have delivered the same to succession of posterity hitherto in the state of liberty. For which they deserve commendation, but our fathers deserve yet more; for that besides what descended on them, not without great labour of their own they have purchased this our present dominion and delivered the same over to us that now are. Which in a great part also we ourselves that are yet in the strength of our age here present have enlarged and so furnished the city with everything, both for peace and war, as it is now all-sufficient in itself. The actions of war whereby all this was attained and the deeds of arms both of ourselves and our fathers in valiant opposition to the barbarians or Grecians in their wars against us, amongst you that are well acquainted with the sum, to avoid prolixity I will pass over. But by what institutions we arrived at this, by what form of government and by what means we have advanced the state to this greatness, when I shall have laid open this, I shall then descend to these men's praises. For I think they are things both fit for the purpose in hand and profitable to the whole company, both of citizens and strangers, to hear related. "We have a form of government not fetched by imitation from the laws of our neighboring states (nay, we are rather a pattern to others, than they to us) which, because in the administration it hath respect not to a few but to the multitude, is called a democracy. Wherein, though there be an equality amongst all men in point of law for their private controversies, yet in conferring of dignities one man is preferred before another to public charge, and that according to the reputation not of his house but of his virtue, and is not put back through poverty for the obscurity of his person as long as he can do good service to the commonwealth. And we live not only free in the administration of the state but also one with another void of jealousy touching each other's daily course of life, not offended at any man for following his own humour, nor casting on any man censorious looks, which though they be no punishment, yet they grieve. So that conversing one with another for the private without offence, we stand chiefly in fear to transgress against the public and are obedient always to those that govern and to the laws, and principally to such laws as are written for protection against injury, and such unwritten as bring undeniable shame to the transgressors. "We have also found out many ways to give our minds recreation from labour by public institution of games and sacrifices for all the days of the year with a decent pomp and furniture of the same by private men, by the daily delight whereof we expel sadness. We have this farther by the greatness of our city that all things from all parts of the earth are imported hither, whereby we no less familiarly enjoy the commodities of all other nations than our own. "Then in the studies of war we excel our enemies in this. We leave our city open to all men; nor was it ever seen that by banishing of strangers we denied them the learning or sight of any of those things which, if not hidden, an enemy might reap advantage by, not relying on secret preparation and deceit but upon our own courage in the action. They, in their discipline, hunt after valour presently from their youth with laborious exercise, and yet we that live remissly undertake as great dangers as they. For example, the Lacedaemonians invade not our dominion by themselves alone but with the aid of all the rest. But when we invade our neighbours, though we fight in hostile ground against such as in their own ground fight in defence of their own substance, yet for the most part we get the victory. Never enemy yet fell into the hands of our whole forces at once both because we apply ourselves much to navigation and by land also send many of our men into divers countries abroad. But when, fighting with a part of it, they chance to get the better, they boast they have beaten the whole; and when they get the worse, they say they are beaten by the whole. And yet when, from ease rather than studious labour and upon natural rather than doctrinal valour, we come to undertake any danger, we have this odds by it that we shall not faint beforehand with the meditation of future trouble, and in the action we shall appear no less confident than they that are ever toiling, procuring admiration to our city as well in this as in divers other things. For we also give ourselves to bravery, and yet with thrift; and to philosophy, and yet without mollification of the mind. And we use riches rather for opportunities of action than for verbal ostentation, and hold it not a shame to confess poverty but not to have avoided it. Moreover there is in the same men a care both of their own and the public affairs and a sufficient knowledge of state matters even in those that labour with their hands. For we only think one that is utterly ignorant therein to be a man not that meddles with nothing but that is good for nothing. We likewise weigh what we undertake and apprehend it perfectly in our minds, not accounting words for a hindrance of action but that it is rather a hindrance to action to come to it without instruction of words before. For also in this we excel others, daring to undertake as much as any and yet examining what we undertake; whereas with other men ignorance makes them dare, and consideration dastards. And they are most rightly reputed valiant who, though they perfectly apprehend both what is dangerous and what is easy, are never the more thereby diverted from adventuring. Again, we are contrary to most men in matter of bounty. For we purchase our friends not by receiving but by bestowing benefits. And he that bestoweth a good turn is ever the most constant friend because he will not lose the thanks due unto him from him whom he bestowed it on. Whereas the friendship of him that oweth a benefit is dull and flat, as knowing his benefit not to be taken for a favour but for a debt. So that we only do good to others not upon computation of profit but freeness of trust. "In sum it may be said both that the city is in general a school of the Grecians, and that the men here have everyone in particular his person disposed to most diversity of actions, and yet all with grace and decency. And that this is not now rather a bravery of words upon the occasion than real truth, this power of the city, which by these institutions we have obtained, maketh evident. For it is the only power now found greater in proof than fame, and the only power, that neither grieveth the invader when he miscarries with the quality of those he was hurt by, nor giveth cause to the subjected states to murmur as being in subjection to men unworthy. For both with present and future ages we shall be in admiration for a power not without testimony but made evident by great arguments, and which needeth not either a Homer to praise it or any other such whose poems may indeed for the present bring delight, but the truth will afterwards confute the opinion conceived of the actions. For we have opened unto us by our courage all seas and lands and set up eternal monuments on all sides both of the evil we have done to our enemies and the good we have done to our friends. "Such is the city for which these men, thinking it no reason to lose it, valiantly fighting have died. And it is fit that every man of you that be left should be like minded to undergo any travail for the same. "And I have therefore spoken so much concerning the city in general as well to show you that the stakes between us and them, whose city is not such, are not equal as also to make known by effects the worth of these men I am to speak of, the greatest part of their praises being therein already delivered. For what I have spoken of the city hath by these, and such as these, been achieved. Neither would praises and actions appear so levelly concurrent in many other of the Grecians as they do in these, the present revolution of these men's lives seeming unto me an argument of their virtues, noted in the first act thereof and in the last confirmed. For even such of them as were worse than the rest do nevertheless deserve that for their valour shown in the wars for defence of their country they should be preferred before the rest. For having by their good actions abolished the memory of their evil, they have profited the state thereby more than they have hurt it by their private behaviour. Yet there was none of these that preferring the further fruition of his wealth was thereby grown cowardly, or that for hope to overcome his poverty at length and to attain to riches did for that cause withdraw himself from the danger. For their principal desire was not wealth but revenge on their enemies, which esteeming the most honourable cause of danger, they made account through it both to accomplish their revenge and to purchase wealth withal; putting the uncertainty of success to the account of their hope, but for that which was before their eyes relying upon themselves in the action, and therein choosing rather to fight and die than to shrink-and be saved, they fled from shame, but with their bodies they stood out the battle; and so in a moment whilst fortune inclineth neither way, left their lives not in fear but in opinion of victory. "Such were these men, worthy of their country. And for you that remain, you may pray for a safer fortune, but you ought not to be less venturously minded against the enemy, not weighing the profit by an oration only, which any man amplifying may recount to you that know as well as he the many commodities that arise by fighting valiantly against your enemies, but contemplating the power of the city in the actions of the same from day to day performed and thereby becoming enamoured of it. And when this power of the city shall seem great to you, consider then that the same was purchased by valiant men, and by men that knew their duty, and by men that were sensible of dishonour when they were in fight, and by such men as, though they failed of their attempt, yet would not be wanting to the city with their virtue but made unto it a most honourable contribution. For having everyone given his body to the commonwealth, they receive in place thereof an undecaying commendation and a most remarkable sepulchre not wherein they are buried so much as wherein their glory is laid up upon all occasions both of speech and action to be remembered forever. For to famous men all the earth is a sepulchre; and their virtues shall be testified not only by the inscription in stone at home but by an unwritten record of the mind, which more than of any monument will remain with everyone forever. In imitation therefore of these men and placing happiness in liberty and liberty in valour, be forward to encounter the dangers of war. For the miserable and desperate men are not they that have the most reason to be prodigal of their lives, but rather such men as, if they live, may expect a change of fortune and whose losses are greatest if they miscarry in aught. For to a man of any spirit death, which is without sense, arriving whilst he is in vigour and common hope, is nothing so bitter as after a tender life to be brought into misery.